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ABSTRACT 
What are the effects of individual disengagement on an insurgency campaign? Current 
research does not articulate the consequences experienced, more broadly, when an 
individual fighter departs from violence. Because of this shortcoming, disengagement 
programs are often poorly timed and make inefficient use of resources. That being said, 
disengagement has the potential to be an influential component of comprehensive 
counterinsurgency efforts when it is properly used to inhibit an insurgency campaign’s 
ability to operate efficiently. This thesis considers the manner in which individual 
disengagement accomplishes this by affecting the psychological and social processes of 
the fighters that remain, and having extensive impacts on the campaign’s human and 
social capital, as well as its ability to conduct operations. Finally, it considers the extent 
to which the insurgency’s lifecycle stage, its leadership, and its ideology influence these 
phenomena. This analysis concludes by suggesting that disengagement behavior will 
spread through expressive networks by way of social contagion. Furthermore, while 
disengagement programs will have certain impacts as an insurgency grows, they will 
most effectively catalyze the demise of a campaign during stages of decline.  
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I.  PREVIOUS THOUGHTS ON DISENGAGEMENT 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Disengagement has profound effects on an organization. Only one person may 
walk away from violence in the beginning, but this single act soon has a significant 
impact on the rest of the organization. One individual’s psychological process suddenly 
compels a social process that manifests itself in both individual and group phenomena. 
This is the most intriguing aspect of disengagement. In the struggle against insurgent 
organizations, disengagement defeats more than just a single combatant; it has the 
potential to precipitate the decline of entire organizations and movements. For this 
reason, disengagement holds much potential and its complexities must be appreciated. 
The possibilities disengagement represents are unlike killing or capturing an 
adversary; it is much more than the removal of one single fighter. When individuals 
disengage from violence voluntarily, they express clear dissatisfaction with the 
organization and how involvement in it is affecting their lives. The insurgent who opts to 
disengage sees a better alternative. For the insurgency campaign more broadly, the 
question becomes: How do other members of the group react to this move? Do friends 
and followers continue to pledge their support to the organization and its objectives, or 
does one individual’s decision give them pause and similar behavior becomes contagious 
among other members in the insurgent network? Although the answers to these questions 
will depend greatly on the characteristics of the disengaged, and the organization from 
which they come, they are sure to be to the campaign’s detriment.  
Disengagement has the potential to catalyze the demise of insurgent organizations 
when it produces consequences that inhibit these groups’ ability to operate efficiently and 
with precision. Complete organizational collapse will not always result from individual 
members disengaging from violence. That is not to say they cannot be a useful 
component of a broader counterinsurgency initiative. The U.S. has attempted several 
different disengagement programs in past counterinsurgencies. Other countries have also 
done so with varying degrees of success in other contexts. In order to have the greatest 
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opportunity for success, pursuit of a disengagement strategy must be informed by the 
potential it has to reduce violence and combat insurgencies. Appreciation of the 
organizational, leadership, and growth state dynamics in an insurgency will help 
accomplish objectives in a manner whereby resources are efficiently devoted to strategies 
that reduce insurgents’ capacity to conduct violent activities. 
B.  BACKGROUND 
Much study has been devoted to the processes of deradicalization in persons who 
profess extremist ideologies, and more recently, to disengagement from violence. 
Whereas deradicalization is a social and psychological process whereby an individual no 
longer believes in a violent ideology1 and has been the aim of most programs designed to 
undermine organizations based on ideology, disengagement is distinct in that it does not 
require ideological change or denunciation. Disengagement occurs when an individual 
experiences a change in role that involves cessation of violent activities.  
Government and military programs that promote disengagement from violence 
can target the collective group, and/or individual members. Individual disengagement 
tactics include various forms of overtures to organizational leaders and senior level 
commanders, mid-level bosses and resource managers, or lower level group members. To 
the extent individuals accept these and disengage, there are likely to be impacts on other 
members in the organization and the organization as a whole. The degree of impact is 
likely to correspond to the nature of disengaged members’ network ties, as well as the 
formal or informal influence an individual holds within an organization. Regardless of 
level, disengagement is a highly contextualized activity affected not only by personal 
relationships, but the social, political, and economic environment as well. The overall 
context must be appreciated or disengagement is likely to result in the misapplication of 
vital resources to no operational or strategic end.  
In this thesis, I propose a set of principles to be used as guidelines to use in 
consideration of the objectives, timing, and formulation of disengagement strategies. 
Using studies of previous military disengagement programs aimed at reducing violence in 
                                                 
1 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, New York: Routledge, 2009, 152–153. 
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counterinsurgency campaigns, I will analyze the extent to which the effects of 
disengagement on insurgent organizations successfully achieved a reduction in the level 
of violence.  
C.  HYPOTHESIS 
The following preliminary hypotheses were used to inform the forthcoming 
literature review. They will be elaborated upon prior to the presentation of the case 
studies used in this paper. 
Hypothesis 1: I deduce that an individual’s decision to leave an insurgency 
campaign and disengage from violence has effects on the persons in the organization with 
whom they have relationships. These effects will be greater when the reason for 
disengagement represents a faltering of belief that resounds with their associates.  
Hypothesis 2: The more rank an individual enjoys in an insurgent organization, 
the more people they are able to influence by way of greater network centrality and 
significance of relationships; the impact of each interaction is greater as the individual’s 
rank carries relatively greater influence. Accordingly, the organizational impact of a 
fighter’s disengagement will be greater with increased rank.  
Hypothesis 3: The effects of disengagement by high-ranking individuals on other 
persons will be more significant and more negative when the organization’s lifecycle 
stage is one of growth, rather than when it is in a state of decline. Organizational growth 
refers to the overall trend of the organization’s violent activities and is irrespective of its 
overall size. Growth will be perceived to be demonstrative of the ideology’s legitimacy 
and the leadership’s ability to be successful. Therefore, individuals in positions of 
influence will enjoy a relatively greater level of confidence and this enhanced confidence 
will lead to more profound effects when they decide to disengage.  
Hypothesis 4: Conversely, when the organization’s strength is in a state of relative 
decline, irrespective of size, higher-ranking individuals will have reduced levels of 
influence. The subsequent effects of disengagement by subordinate members, however, 
will be greater during this time. Subordinates will perceive they have been failed by the 
  4
insurgency and will seek to gain the benefits offered by disengagement, whether they are 
social, financial, or legal incentives. This will have a contagion effect on other lower 
level members who view it in their best interests to also disengage before the 
organization declines any further. In this case, they fear that the organization will 
eventually fall apart and leave them without protection and a missed opportunity to 
benefit from government disengagement incentives.  
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.  Process of Disengagement 
The concepts of deradicalization and disengagement are distinctly different in the 
end state they seek and the strategies they employ. Of the two, deradicalization 
techniques have been more prevalent in attempts to reform persons with extremist 
views—most recently, those associated with radical Islamism. Deradicalization programs 
make the assumption that extremist ideologies legitimize and advocate violence on their 
behalf. As long as ideological beliefs persist in the minds of believers, they will seek to 
redress their sense of injustice and grievances against the perceived wrongdoer. 
Therefore, these programs seek to dismantle this belief system.2 In the case of radical 
Islamists, for example, deradicalization programs employ Islamic scholars for their 
“epistemic authority” in the eyes of prospective converts. These scholarly authorities 
engage in religious dialogue with program’s subjects in order to counter the notion that 
Islam condones terrorism against civilians3 and convince them their terrorist 
organizations egregiously twist the pillars of Islam.  
The process of disengagement, conversely, recognizes a distinction in behavioral 
and cognitive processes. John Horgan describes disengagement as a process whereby an 
individual or group no longer engages in violence. The ideological change that is a 
                                                 
2 Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand, and Rohan Gunaratna, “Detainee Deradicalization: A 
Challenge for Psychological Science,” Association for Psychological Science Observer 23, no. 1 (January 
2010). 
3 Arie W. Kruglanski, A. Raviv, D. Bar-Tal, A. Raviv, K. Sharvit, S. Ellis, et al. 2005, “Says Who? 
Epistemic Authority Effects in Social Judgment,” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, edited 
by M.P. Zanna, vol. 37, 346–392, New York: Academic Press. 
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feature of deradicalization does not necessarily follow.4 According to Horgan, factors in 
the disengagement process include both psychological and physical issues.5 Often, the 
instance occurs when the behavioral change that accompanies physical disengagement 
from terrorism is not accompanied by a psychological change or reduction in ideological 
support, or influence over the individual by the ideology.6 An individual may be 
disengaged from violence but not be repentant at all.7 Additionally, he suggests that the 
pathway to disengagement is not the same for everyone, nor does the individual 
experience the same qualities.8  
2.  The Psychology of Moving Away From Violence 
Renee Garfinkel detailed the prevailing social and cognitive processes associated 
with the psychological change involved in a departure from violence. Her series of 
interviews with seven former members of violent religious extremist groups discovered it 
to be a process in which the individual felt vulnerable, and was often brought about by 
stress, crisis, and trauma.9 This event frequently involved a perceived failure in their 
values and beliefs. The subsequent change was one that took place by degrees and found 
that actual acceptance of the ‘enemy’ is a process that takes place over time. She also 
discovered the absence of an authority figure in the individuals’ movement away from 
violence, but did observe that change was often contingent on a personal friend or mentor 
that affirmed peaceful behavior. Finally, each individual experienced the loss of 
friendships and a period of isolation until s/he was able to develop new relationships and 
a different social network.10  
                                                 
4 Horgan, Walking Away, 17, 19. 
5 John Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a 
Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation,” Perspectives on Terrorism 2, no. 4 (February 2008): 3–
8, 4–5. 
6 Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement,” 5. 
7 Horgan, Walking Away, 27. 
8 Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement,” 5. 
9 Renee Garfinkel, “Personal Transformations: Moving From Violence To Peace,” United States 
Institute of Peace, Special Report 186 (April 2007), 1. 
10 Garfinkel, “Personal Transformations,” 11–13. 
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3.  Departure from Violent Anti-social Groups 
A number of previous studies have focused on these processes for individuals of 
various anti-social groups. Although these groups differ in their ideologies and 
objectives, the factors and processes involved in their members leaving have proven to be 
very similar. This suggests that lessons learned in studies of racist groups, religious cults, 
and criminal youth gangs can be thoughtfully applied to the study of terrorist groups.  
In his study of right wing racist groups, Tore Bjorgo recognizes that most activists 
consider leaving their organization at some point. In making the decision to lead a normal 
life, they consider both push and pull factors. Push factors are negative circumstances or 
social forces that make it unappealing to remain in a particular group. He suggests these 
might include negative social sanctions, disillusionment with the organization or its 
ideology, or burnout resulting from constant pressure. Pull factors, on the other hand, are 
those that make an alternative more attractive than present circumstance. These often 
appeal to an activist’s longing for a normal life or a desire to establish a family and 
accept spousal and parental roles.11  
Despite the presence of these incentives, Bjorgo emphasizes that involvement in 
the group may still entail sufficient factors that discourage leaving. This frequently has to 
do with the positive characteristics of friendship and social support. At times, even when 
faith in ideology is lost, an individual stays with a group because of strong friendship and 
social bonds. Activists also contemplate the risks of leaving that might include negative 
sanctions from the group and loss of protection from former adversaries. Additionally, an 
activist may fear an isolated return to their former life, as social ties were likely broken 
when s/he joined the group. As a result, although they consider quitting, members of 
racist groups may elect to stay if they consider it a more attractive alternative.12 
Extensive research on youth gangs also provides examples of the effects of push 
and pull factors on gang members. Gangs serve to fulfill functional needs by providing 
                                                 
11 Tore Bjorgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist 
Groups,” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, no. 627 (June 2002), 11–13. 
12 Bjorgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism,” 13–15. 
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their members with identity, community, protection, and excitement.13 Studies have 
found that the more the gang was stigmatized in the local community, the more difficult it 
was for gang members to re-integrate into a normal life.14 James Vigil observed that the 
process of leaving a gang was not dissimilar to joining, in that it involved a gradual 
process of increased commitments. However, he found leaving to be more difficult than 
joining as this required separating from one’s closest friends. Because of this support and 
friendship, he argues that a member does not leave until this social network is adequately 
replaced.15 
4.  Collective Disengagement 
As previously mentioned, disengagement from a violent organization may be an 
individual, or a collective process.16 Martha Crenshaw observes the process in which a 
terrorist organization weakens may be determined by internal forces, as well as by 
external policies and actors.17 Audrey Cronin cites seven explanations for the ending or 
decline of a terrorist group. These include: “1) the capture or killing of the leader, 2) the 
failure to transition to the next generation, 3) achievement of the group’s aims, 4) 
transition to a legitimate political process, 5) undermining of popular support, 6) 
repression, and 7) transitioning from terrorism to other forms of violence.”18 As 
evidenced by these explanations, a terrorist group may destruct regardless of whether or 
not action is taken against them.  
The process of collective disengagement is often used as a strategy to catalyze the 
demise of terrorist groups. For example, al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ) both engaged in various forms of violence and terrorism in the name of 
                                                 
13 Albert K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, New York: Free Press, 1955.  
14 William J. Chambliss, “The Saints and the Roughnecks,” Society (November/December 1973). 
15 James D. Vigil, “Group Processes and Street Identity: Adolescent Chicano Gang Members,” Ethos 
16, no. 4 (1988): 421–445. 
16 Horgan, “Deradicalization or Disengagement,” 5. 
17 Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Ends,” United States Institute of Peace (May 25, 1999), 2–4. 
18 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Terrorist Campaigns End,” In Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual 
and Collective Disengagement, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, 49–65, New York: Routledge, 
2009, 55.  
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radical Islamism beginning in the 1970s. However, in 1997, the leadership of both 
organizations declared an end to combat operations. That marked the beginning of a 
process in which al-Gama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ renounced their violent beliefs and 
adopted a new system of thought that abandoned all violence.19 They did so with a 
theoretical model based in Islam and jurisprudence. This marked a move across the 
Islamist spectrum to peaceful sociopolitical movements that no longer condemned the 
faith of fellow Muslims. Subsequently, they focused on the realignment of social, 
political, and economic affairs in accordance with the teachings of Islam.20 
In his study of the events in Egypt, Diaa Rashwan cited several factors that led to 
al-Gama’a al-Islamiya’s leadership’s decision to cease combat operations and revise their 
system of thought. Among these was what the leadership referred to as a ‘military 
defeat.’ The state’s security policy inflicted significant losses on the organization in the 
way of arrests, armed clashes, prison and death sentences, as well harsh treatment in 
detention facilities and prisons. Both leadership and general membership were 
significantly impacted. In spite of past conflict and in recognition of the demonstrated 
sincerity of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya’s desire to review its thoughts and stances, the 
Egyptian security establishment facilitated meetings between the group’s free leaders and 
those within the prison system.21 Despite this allowance, the group still faced internal 
strife during the revision process as its rank and file members, many of whom had spent 
years in prisons, questioned the shift away from violence. This necessitated a lengthy 
period of dialogue to convince them to accept the new system of thought.22 Ultimately, 
al-Gama’a al-Islamiya’s cohesive organizational structure enabled it to overcome these 
challenges and implement its revised perspective that called for an end to violence.23 EIJ, 
on the other hand, lacked this centralized framework and consequently received more 
                                                 
19 Diaa Rashwan, “The Renunciation of Violence by Egyptian Jihadi Organizations,” In Leaving 
Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, New 
York: Routledge, 2009, 113, 121. 
20 Rashwan, “Renunciation of Violence,” 121. 
21 Rashwan, “Renunciation of Violence,” 123–24. 
22 Rashwan, “Renunciation of Violence,” 129. 
23 While Gama’a al-Islamiya participates in peaceful, legal activities, some of its former members 
have united with Al Qaeda and continue to participate in violence on its behalf. 
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focused security attention during its process of ideological reconsideration.24 Although 
EIJ followed a revisionist process through 2007, it failed in its attempt to transition from 
violent extremism to centrist beliefs. A lack of coherent leadership structure and a history 
marked by organizational schisms contributed to this failure at revision and ultimately 
ended with the organization merging with Al-Qaeda. 
The collective disengagement of radical Islamists in Algeria offers another 
example of a pragmatic process where the groups did not revise their ideologies in 
justifying their decision to abandon their armed wing.25 Omar Ashour’s examination of 
Algeria’s disengagement program aimed at the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—the armed wing of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front 
(FIS)—found that state repression, inducements, social interaction, and organizational 
leadership were critical factors that contributed to the process.26 While both organizations 
were subject to similar treatment, leadership and interaction with other organizations 
proved to be the critical factors for different levels of disengagement within AIS and 
GIA. 
The Algerian state imposed intensely repressive measures against radical 
Islamists after the government cancelled national elections in 1992. In the first five years 
of the conflict that ensued, the government claimed responsibility for over 10,000 
‘disappeared persons’, and imprisonment of 17,000 armed Islamists between 1992 and 
1997.27 In an effort to address these past grievances and make the disengagement process 
                                                 
24 Rashwan, “Renunciation of Violence,” 125. 
25 Omar Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures,” The Middle East 
Institute Policy Brief, no. 21 (November 2008), 1.  
26 Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization,” 5. 
27 Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization,” 6. 
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more attractive, the Algerian government offered selective incentives.28 These included 
government compliance with AIS’s demand to release all its prisoners, as well as FIS 
leadership and affiliates. It also provided employment and compensation to families who 
had been victimized by the government during the conflict.29  
Social interaction by the Algerian Islamist groups also proved to be a relevant 
factor. The leadership of the AIS was influenced positively by non-Islamist and other 
Islamist organizations, namely Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a group that had previously 
renounced violence.30 The GIA, on the other hand, had sparse interaction with other 
organizations, primarily because of its excessive violence. Additionally, Ashour found 
the strength of leadership to be crucial. The AIS had a cohesive, charismatic leadership 
that proved willing to disengage. It was able to effectively dismantle its armed wing, as 
well as influence smaller armed affiliates to likewise disarm. Conversely, the GIA did not 
have this type of leadership.31 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
As can be inferred from the paragraphs above, it is not possible to identify one 
definitive strategy as facilitating a successful disengagement program. Disengagement is 
a contextual activity dependent upon social, political, and economic factors. Success or 
failure may be more a function of environmental and organizational variables than it is a 
particular set of inducements. Therefore, determining precise causal relationships with an 
insurgency campaign’s internal and external environment is a highly subjective activity, 
and determining correlation is more realistic. Developing a methodology to effectively 
                                                 
28 The Algerian regime sought to enhance the deradicalization process of militants by addressing 
several major issues with the use of selective inducements. These included political prisoners, social 
reintegration, and the role of the military’s role in politics. It began with the release of FIS detainees, 
leaders, and other affiliates, including high-profile prisoners like the GIA’s founder, ‘Abd al-Haqq Layada, 
Additionally, President Bouteflika apologized and provided various forms of compensation to former 
guerrillas and their families for discrimination against them by the regime and its associates. The regime 
also provided personal arms to former AIS commanders for protection against potential threats. Finally, in 
an ostensible effort to depoliticize the army, 800 senior officers—to include the Commander of Land 
forces—were removed from their positions and provided pensions. – from Ashour, “Islamist De-
Radicalization,” 9–10. 
29 Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization,” 9. 
30 Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization,” 8. 
31 Ashour, “Islamist De-Radicalization,” 2. 
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gauge the scope and utility of past disengagement programs is also hindered by the 
quantity and type of data available, particularly that which might indicate social 
psychological processes and motivations of those that participated. That said, studying 
the circumstances in which individual disengagement is most likely to help facilitate the 
demise of insurgency campaigns is a worthwhile venture. The steps below describe the 
methodology that will be used to test this paper’s hypotheses.  
Step 1. Define the Problem.  
What membership levels should disengagement strategies target in order to most 
effectively reduce an insurgency campaign’s capacity to conduct violence?  
Step 2. Identify and Operationalize the Variables.  
The Independent Variable in this thesis is the membership level targeted by the 
disengagement program. For the purposes of this paper, the following typology will be 
used to delineate insurgency membership levels. Those with operational roles will be 
considered low-level members. Low-level individuals with operational roles are 
responsible for physically executing violent attacks. These roles require relatively few 
skills and little training, yet assume the greatest level of risk and exposure to capture. 
Furthermore, these individuals are relatively junior in the organization. Those in 
supporting roles will be considered mid-level members. Individuals with these roles 
perform an ancillary purpose that serves to provide resources that enable leaders and 
operators to conduct attacks. These individuals include recruiters, resource providers, and 
financiers, among others. Those in planning and mobilizing roles will be considered high-
level members. Individuals occupying these leadership roles serve to guide and 
coordinate the organization’s ideology, purpose, and mission. The categorization of an 
individual’s role will be determined by their self-admitted function in the organization, 
with the most significant role taking precedence in the event an individual performs 
multiple functions. If this level of detail is not attainable, it will be determined by the 
nature of the offense an individual is known to have committed.  
The Intervening Variable is the growth trend of the organization. This will be 
measured by the insurgency campaign’s violent attacks per year. Specifically, campaigns 
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will be characterized as being in a state of growth or decline based on an upward or 
downward trend of this metric. When the campaign demonstrates an annual increase in its 
growth trend, it will be considered to be in a state of growth. When the campaign 
experiences an annual decrease in its growth trend, it will be considered to be in a state of 
decline. Lastly, since one of the goals of any insurgency is to increase its capacity to 
conduct violence so that it can eventually defeat the state, this paper will consider 
campaigns that remain static as failing to make progress toward accomplishing their 
objective and thus, in a relative state of decline. 
The Dependent Variable is the violent activities of the organization. This will be 
measured by the number of insurgent initiated attacks per year. For the purposes of this 
paper, the size of the attack will not matter. What is relevant is that it is enemy generated 
activity deemed to reflect the insurgent campaign’s capacity to mobilize resources and 
conduct operations.  
Lastly, the notion of social contagion among members of networks will be 
examined to determine if it takes place when individual insurgents disengage from 
violence. Without access to disengaged persons and knowledge of their social networks, 
it is impossible to determine the individual and group factors that influenced their 
decision to leave the insurgency campaigns of which they were members. Therefore, in 
an effort to appreciate how the phenomenon of leaving violence can spread among an 
insurgency’s members, the patterns of the popularity of disengagement will be analyzed 
over time. Specifically, it will be measured by a comparative analysis of the percentage 
growth of disengaged insurgents from one year to the next, with levels of insurgent 
attacks during that same year.  
Step 3. Collecting the Data.  
Numerous cases exist where disengagement programs were utilized to induce 
fighters to leave insurgency campaigns. Historical data from these will be examined 
using the methodology described above in order to facilitate analysis of the relationships 
between the rank and number of disengaged insurgents, insurgency growth trends, and  
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insurgent initiated violence. This paper will study the cases of the Chieu Hoi Program in 
Vietnam, the amnesty program used during the Malayan Emergency, and the Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission in Afghanistan. 
Step 4. Determining Causal Relationships.  
This step will attempt to identify well-specified causal relationships between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable. It will also identify any antecedent 
conditions and intervening variables that affect the independent variable’s interaction 
with the dependent variable.  
Step 5. Determine Applicability.  
As a final step, the thesis evaluates the applicability of the findings. More 
specifically, given the findings, how might the U.S. use these findings to employ 
disengagement strategies under appropriate conditions?  
F.  THESIS PREVIEW AND ROADMAP 
In this thesis, I argue that, in order to achieve the greatest impact in defeating 
insurgent organizations, appropriate levels of membership should be targeted depending 
on the relative strength of the insurgency. In an attempt to do so, Chapter II examines 
literature from the disciplines of social psychology, network theory, and organizational 
theory. Moving beyond the individual psychological processes of disengagement, it will 
account for the both the micro and macro level theoretical perspectives in examination of 
the social and organizational impacts of individuals exiting organizations. Chapter III 
analyzes the importance of leadership as it relates to influence over an organization’s 
membership. It also examines how leadership is affected by the organization’s relative 
state of growth or decline. Finally, it considers the impact of ideology on an individual’s 
utility function when considering disengaging from violence. Chapter IV proposes a set 
of principles to inform individual disengagement strategies for insurgency campaigns 
based on the theoretical foundations outlined in previous chapters. Chapter V consists of 
case studies of disengagement programs in Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan. Finally, 
Chapter VI considers policy implications and proposes further research.  
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II.  SOCIAL NETWORK PERSPECTIVES 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
At the individual level, disengagement can occur for a variety of reasons. It might 
be a state of disillusionment that results when the organization does not meet 
expectations or when strategic differences arise. In other instances, it may have little to 
do with the group and its objectives and more to do with a change in personal priorities.32 
In either case, it is an individual decision. Social processes, though, help inform 
individual psychology. Rarely does an individual make a decision without considering, or 
being informed by, the attitudes and behavior of those with whom they socialize. The 
ideas and values obtained from personal and professional relationships help shape an 
individual’s attitudes and behavior and—in this case—the decision to disengage. Social 
psychological processes comparable to those experienced by the disengaged member will 
also have repercussions on the thoughts and actions of other members of an organization. 
Accordingly, the effects of an individual leaving an organization will not end abruptly 
with only one member’s departure. 
An assessment of the social psychological processes that occur in social network 
relations is relevant to disengagement because of its potential to consider the way in 
which individuals impact the decision-making and behavior of one another. 
Understanding these processes and their effects on the group prior to, during, and after 
disengagement promises to provide a more comprehensive appreciation of how an 
individual’s departure impacts an organization and each of its members. To consider the 
impacts of individual decisions and behavior within a group, the importance of network 
relationships will be considered first. 
                                                 
32 John Horgan, “Individual Disengagement, A Psychological Analysis,” In Leaving Terrorism 
Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, 17–29, New 
York: Routledge, 2009, 21–22.  
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B.  SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Social network theory provides a framework to relate the relationships of socially 
connected individuals. A social network is a “finite set or sets of actors and the relation, 
or relations, defined on them.”33 Nodes represent individual actors, and relationships 
between actors are depicted by the existence or non-existence of nodal ties.34 Insurgent 
and terrorist organizations are like other networks in that they consist of actors linked by 
professional, friendship, and familial ties. The overall structure of the networks, whether 
a function of organizational design or the result of social interaction, portrays the 
connections that exist amongst its members. Multiple networks overlap just as the 
individual connections and relationships within them frequently overlap.  
Ibarra and Andrews portray relationships between actors in the context of two 
different types of networks. Instrumental, or formal, networks are those that provide an 
employee with work-related advice and information, as well as the resources, expert 
knowledge, and “political access” required to function effectively in the organization. 
Expressive, or informal, networks, on the other hand, are those in which an employee 
derives friendship ties and social support.35 This is not to imply that the two are 
independent or separate; formal networks of organizations tend to inform and overlap 
with patterns of social relations.36 Relationships initially form to help the organization 
function, but often evolve to the point where their influence extends beyond work 




                                                 
33 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 20. 
34 Daniel J. Brass, J. Galaskiewicz, H. R. Greve, and W. Tsai, “Taking Stock of Networks and 
Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective,” Academy of Management Journal 47 (2004): 795. 
35 Herminia Ibarra, “Personal Networks of Women and Minorities in Management: A Conceptual 
Framework,” Academy of Management Review 18, no. 1 (1993): 56–87. 
36 Mark Granovetter, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” 
American Journal of Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 481–510. 
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formal network,37 but are not necessarily constrained by it. The formal network simply 
presents opportunities for interaction and the individual actor chooses with whom to form 
a social relationship.38  
The expressive networks that develop out of these relationships are as important 
to the organization as its instrumental networks. Similar individuals in expressive 
networks develop relationships that possess high levels of trust and intimacy between one 
another. Instrumental networks, on the other hand, consist of weaker ties that link more 
diverse individuals.39 Leon Festinger’s Social Comparison Theory helps explain the 
significance of this. Individuals decide who to have relationships with and learn about 
themselves by way of comparison with others. When they do so, they prefer to compare 
their ideas and abilities and also interact with those they view as being similar to 
themselves; this could be on the basis of ethnicity, age, or similar structural roles in an 
organization. This tendency, referred to as homophily, has significant effects on 
relationships, as well as thoughts and behavior. 40  
The thoughts and ideas relationships engender affect individual decisions and 
behavior, and—in the case of an organization—the group-at-large.41 Interacting with 
similar others is believed to ease communication and increase familiarity, which brings 
about trust and reciprocity.42 Shared relationships in a network that exhibit these 
characteristics frequently allow for increased trust and interaction norms between groups 
and individuals. Since investments, risks, and performance all entail shared costs and 
benefits among a group’s members,43 individuals in a group will prefer to interact with 
others with whom they have something in common. An individual’s expressive network 
                                                 
37 Brass et al., “Taking Stock,” 795–819. 
38 W. A. Mason, F. R. Conrey, and E. R. Smith, “Situating Social Influence Processes: Dynamic, 
Multidirectional Flows of Influence within Social Networks,” Personality and Social Psychology Review: 
An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 11, no. 3 (2007): 286. 
39 Ibarra, “Personal Networks,” 56–87. 
40 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954. 
41 Mason et al., “Situating Social Influence,” 286. 
42 Brass et al., “Taking Stock,” 796. 
43 Andrea Larson, “Network Dyads in Entrepreneurial Settings: A Study of the Governance of 
Exchange Relationships,” Administrative Science Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1992): 87–89. 
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also affects their loyalty and commitment to the organization.44 Networked individuals 
are likely to be happier, more committed, and less likely to leave their organization.45 
Loyalty among members has been found to be more meaningful to an individual than 
dedication to "an amorphous, distant…corporate entity."46 In summary, the extent to 
which relationships and expressive networks are strong, they are beneficial for 
individuals, as well as the organization. 
The density of network ties is also relevant for the organization. Feeley, Hwang, 
and Barnett argue that the number of friendship ties is more significant than the closeness 
of ties for retaining organizational membership. The greater number of these ties provides 
multiple support lines through which individuals can seek to reduce stress. They propose 
the idea that friends’ being “in it together” enables groups to persevere through the worst 
of jobs and circumstances.47 Ultimately, it is the interests of the organization to foster and 
maintain relationships to promote stability within the organization.  
C.  ORGANIZATIONAL TURNOVER AND EMBEDDEDNESS 
When an individual exits any network, relationship ties are altered and sometimes 
severed. The social psychological processes that ensue have effects on the behavior of 
those that remain in the organization. In business, the process in which an actor exits an 




                                                 
44 Bruce Buchanan, “Building Organizational Commitment: The Socialization of Managers in Work 
Organizations,” Administrative Science Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1974): 533–546. 
45 B. Wellman and K. Frank, 2001, “Network Capital in a Multi-level World: Getting Support from 
Personal Communities,” In Social Capital: Theory and Research, edited by Nan Lin, Karen S. Cook, and 
Ronald S. Burt, New Brunswick, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 2005. 
46 D. C. Feldman, 2000, “From the Me Decade to the Flee Decade,” In Relational Wealth: The 
Advantages of Stability in a Changing Economy, edited by C. R. Leana and D. M. Rousseau, 169–182, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 179. 
47 T. H. Feeley, J. Hwang, and G. Barnett, “Predicting Employee Turnover from Friendship 
Networks,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 36, no. 1 (2008): 66–70. 
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physical separation from a group.48 Individual turnover comes about for a variety of 
reasons that include psychological, or micro, as well as organizational, or macro, 
conditions.49  
Embeddedness is a network measure that explains the variety of factors that 
constrain an individual’s decision and what people stand to lose by leaving their jobs.50 
Mitchell et al refer to three dimensions of embeddedness: links, fit, and sacrifice. Links 
are the formal and informal ties, and entail an individual's social, psychological, and 
financial web. The greater the number of links, the more an individual is bound to other 
individuals, groups, or the organization, and leaving potentially severs or alters those 
relationships. Fit represents the degree to which an individual perceives themselves as 
being an appropriate fit for their job and work environment, as well as having values and 
goals that align with those of the organization and other individuals within the 
organization. Most importantly, sacrifice consists of what an individual loses when 
leaving an organization. These include extrinsic benefits, or more personal losses of 
psychological benefits and relationships.51 Understandably, the more an individual is 
required to give up in leaving an organization, the more difficult the process will be.52  
When the decision to leave is made, it can lead to serious disruptive effects for the 
organization and its members. This is particularly relevant when the losses are significant 
in importance or number.53 Outcomes will be even more profound if the individual is a 
member of a cohesive work group or holds particularly exceptional social status within 
                                                 
48 William H. Mobley, “Some Unanswered Questions in Turnover and Withdrawal Research,” 
Academy of Management Review 7, no. 1 (1982): 111. 
49 Will Felps, Terence R. Mitchell, David R. Hekman, Thomas W. Lee, Brooks C. Holtom, and 
Wendy S. Harman, “Turnover Contagion: How Coworkers' Job Embeddedness and Job Search Behaviors 
Influence Quitting,” Academy of Management Journal, 52, no. 3 (2009): 545. 
50 Terence R. Mitchell, Brooks C. Holtom, Thomas W. Lee, Chris J. Sablynski, and Miriam Erez, 
“Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary Turnover,” Academy of Management 
Journal 44, no. 6 (2001): 1104. 
51 Mitchell et al., “Why People Stay,” 1104–1105. 
52 Jason D. Shaw, John E. Delery, G. Douglas Jenkins, and Nina Gupta, “An Organization-Level 
Analysis of Voluntary and Involuntary Turnover,” Academy of Management Journal 41, no. 5 (1998): 511–
525. 
53 Barry M. Staw, “The Consequences of Turnover,” Journal of Occupational Behavior 1, no. 4 
(1980): 256. 
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the organization.54 That said, effects of turnover are not consistent for all individuals 
across the organization nor are they random. For a given individual or organization, the 
impacts on those who remain will increase with the number of individuals who leave, as 
well as the strength and distance of the network ties they had, and possibly continue to 
have, with the stayers.55 The closer individuals perceive themselves to those who 
departed the organization, the more likely they are to leave.56 
As indicated, the response elicited in individuals remaining in an organization 
after someone leaves is likely to depend on the individual stayer’s relationship to the 
leaver. While members of an individual’s instrumental network on whom work routines 
depend, will potentially have negative repercussions on performance, they are more 
easily replaced.57 The loss of a friend is different in that it takes with it a source of social 
support.58 This consequence has longer-term effects for the individual as new friendship 
ties take a significant amount of time to develop.  
D.  IMPACT OF LOST NETWORK TIES 
In addition to the stayer’s relationship to the leaver, the conditions of the turnover 
will represent real and perceived threats and opportunities for the individual remaining, 
as well as the organization.59 Individuals leaving an organization can undermine the 
attitude of those that remain in the organization who might view their future as less 
desirable and begin to question their reason for staying as a result. Stayers will also be 
made aware of the experience of the leavers, be it positive or negative. In this way, the  
 
                                                 
54 R. M. Steers and R. T. Mowday, 1980, “Employee Turnover and Post-Decision Accommodation 
Processes,” In Research in Organizational Behavior, edited by L. L. Cummings, and B. M. Staw, JAI 
Press, Greenwich, CT. 
55 David Krackhardt and Lyman W. Porter, “When Friends Leave: A Structural Analysis of the 
Relationship between Turnover and Stayers' Attitudes,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 30, no. 2 (1985), 
246–248. 
56 Feeley et al., “Predicting Employee Turnover,” 70. 
57 Priti Pradhan Shah, “Network Destruction: The Structural Implications of Downsizing,” Academy of 
Management Journal 43, no. 1 (2000): 106–108. 
58 Shah, “Network Destruction,” 102. 
59 Shah, “Network Destruction,” 108–9. 
  21
turnover of an individual or group of individuals may precipitate further turnover by 
eroding stayers’ attitudes, as well as informing them of the potential threats and 
opportunities that accompany leaving.60  
Specifically, the perceived reason for departure will have an impact on the 
reaction to an individual's leaving. An individual leaving will not have as great of an 
impact when it is for a non-organizational reason that is more personal in nature, such as 
a sick family member. In the opposite case, leaving behavior will adversely affect the 
morale of those members remaining to the degree it has to do with the organization, such 
as a negative sentiment toward the ideals or objectives of the organization.61  
Heider’s balance theory of friendship offers a perspective for consideration of the 
effects of turnover on the individuals who remain in the organization. He described a 
triangle of relationships between an individual, another person, and an object of common 
interest.62 In the context of organizational turnover, this translates to the stayer, the friend 
who is the leaver, and the organization. If turnover is attributed to an exogenous reason 
beyond the organization's or the individual's control, sympathies do not change and the 
triangle is stable. If, however, leaving is attributed to the dissatisfaction with the 
organization, the stayer is likely to balance the triangle by becoming more dissatisfied 
with the organization.63  
E.  SOCIAL CONTAGION EFFECTS 
When individuals become dissatisfied, it can lead to additional turnover. An 
activity known as Social Influence Processing, describes the ways in which other people 
affect and help shape other individuals’ feelings, beliefs, and behavior.64 It can shape the 
behavior of individuals, as well as entire groups. Introduced earlier, the notion of social 
comparison can perpetuate itself through the process of social influence whereby 
                                                 
60 Staw, “Consequences of Turnover,” 257. 
61 Steers and Mowday, “Employee Turnover.”  
62 Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, New York: Wiley, 1958. 
63 Krackhardt and Porter, “When Friends Leave,” 244–246. 
64 Mason et al., “Situating Social Influence,” 279. 
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individuals have a tendency to become more similar when they interact. They develop 
and adapt their attitudes and beliefs through a process of social interaction in which they 
compare their own opinions with those of others.65 Comparison with another is even 
more likely to be made in unique, risky, or ambiguous situations.66 When considering 
leaving, individuals often experience a high level of uncertainty and risk.67 In an effort to 
cope with these feelings, they look to fellow employees for additional information, 
particularly when no non-social means of comparison exists.68 
In a group, social influence and popular opinion tend to reinforce success or 
failure in a virtuous or vicious cycle.69 Ideas or events are made to appear much better, or 
worse, as they gain momentum. Owing to these phenomena, personnel often turnover in 
clusters; one person's departure induces a snowball effect. This is known as turnover 
contagion, and occurs when an employee searches for a job or leaves an organization, 
thus affecting the leaving behavior of others through social contagion. Krackhardt and 
Porter found this contagion effect spread to clusters that were usually related to persons’ 
roles in the organization. Specifically, these roles were derived from their expressive 
network. Individuals who see themselves in a similar position as those who leave attempt 
to make sense of pertinent information concerning their job, as well as relevant 
alternatives outside the organization. The degree of success experienced by those that 
leave helps reduce ambiguity and inform the viability making the same decision.70 To the 
extent that exit is positive for the leavers, it causes the similar others to consider leaving 
as well.71  
                                                 
65 B. H. Erickson, 1988, “The Relational Basis of Attitudes,” In Social structures: A Network 
Approach, edited by B. Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, 99–121, Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press.  
66 Festinger, Theory of Social Comparison. 
67 Robert P. Steel, “Turnover Theory at the Empirical Interface: Problems of Fit and Function,” 
Academy of Management Review 27, no. 3 (2002): 346–360. 
68 Festinger, Theory of Social Comparison. 
69 Matthew J. Salganik, Peter Sheridan Dodds, and Duncan J. Watts, “Experimental Study of 
Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market,” Science 311, no. 5762 (2006): 854. 
70 Felps et al., “Turnover Contagion,” 546–547. 
71 David Krackhardt and Lyman W. Porter, 1986, “The Snowball Effect: Turnover in Embedded 
Communication Networks,” Journal of Applied Psychology, 71: 50–55. 
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Legitimate opportunities elsewhere have the potential to develop into norms in 
expressive networks and have cumulative effects on attitudes, behaviors, and turnover in 
general.72 Felps et al found an individual's tendency to leave is related to the number of 
others that leave the organization. A relatively large enough number might also serve to 
increase the salience of an individual's decision to leave for personal morale and well-
being.73 As individuals make the decision to leave, the effects on the organization will 
have to do with the number and importance of those that depart.74 
F.  EFFECTS OF TURNOVER ON THE ORGANIZATION 
As individuals leave an organization and do so based largely on connections in 
their expressive networks, the corresponding missing links in the instrumental network 
constrain the organization by limiting the opportunities individuals have to communicate 
information and share resources. When individuals in a network no longer have common 
relationships to connect each other, it is known as a structural hole. Holes in the 
instrumental network can emerge when persons who maintain central ties depart an 
organization and are not replaced with someone who can efficiently perform the same 
function.75 That said, structural holes have implications beyond the instrumental network.  
Structural holes typically represent two types of losses: social and human capital. 
Social ties can be broken, giving stayers fewer people with whom to interact, thus feeling 
isolated; this is referred to as a loss of social capital. 76 The extent to which the loss of 
members of an organization has significant negative repercussions on the organization's 
social fabric is related to the social capital held by departing individuals, as well as their 
                                                 
72 M. A. Abelson, 1993, “Turnover Cultures,” In Research in Personnel and Human Resource 
Management, edited by G. Ferris and G. Rowland, vol. 11: 339–376, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
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professional and personal relationships with remaining members of the organization. 
According to Leana and Van Buren, social capital is "a resource reflecting the character 
of social relations within the organization, realized through members' levels of collective 
goal orientation and shared trust."77 Specifically, trust is a key component of social 
capital. It helps lower transaction costs78 since norms of exchange are strengthened and 
the risk of disingenuous behavior is mitigated.79 When lost, it has exponential effects that 
are detrimental to performance. Likewise, the organization suffers disproportionate losses 
when individuals who hold and are particularly adept at creating social capital leave the 
organization.80 Similar to relationships in expressive networks and unlike human capital, 
it is a resource that cannot be easily replaced when lost.81  
On the other hand, the loss of human capital means specialized skills are no 
longer available to the organization. When individuals depart and take with them an 
efficient knowledge, skill, or process, the organization is left with a reduced capacity to 
generate outcomes.82 Human capital theory suggests that an organization's function relies 
on valuable, firm specific human capital.83 Since turnover undermines human capital, it 
further diminishes productivity.84 The adverse effects increase when there is a greater 
degree of specialization that cannot be readily replaced.85 Similarly, there is typically a 
positive relationship between the departed member's stature in the hierarchy or degree of  
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specialization in the network, and the network disruption.86 The most adverse 
consequences for performance result from the replacement of high-level employees.87 
Staw states:  
The chief moderator of whether turnover causes an operational disruption 
is the centrality of the particular role to the organization’s functioning. In 
general, the higher the level of the position to be filled the greater the 
potential for disruption.88  
Nodes with noteworthy centrality in an organization might include: 1) an individual or 
group whose removal would change the network greatly;89 2) an individual or group who 
can spread information rapidly, such as gossips or early adopters;90 or 3) an individual or 
group that possesses a greater level of power and can produce trouble, or facilitate 
dissidents.91 Knowing the characteristics of those who occupy central locations is 
essential to understanding the organization and which individuals might produce the most 
disruptive and adverse consequences for the organization when removed.  
As central actors are removed and instrumental and expressive networks are 
altered, the remaining members of the organization will likely perceive chaos and 
uncertainty. Susskind et al found that individuals perceived the organization’s position to 
be improving as structural holes were filled. Nonetheless, perceptions of chaos can still 
be exacerbated by the modification of network relationships. As the organization adapts, 
many members of the organization will be made to deal with new co-workers, superiors 
and subordinates, work roles, and work location.92  
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G.  POSITIVE OUTCOMES 
The alteration of relationships and networks does not impact all employees in the 
same way and can also have impacts that are positive and not necessarily aligned with 
those described above. While some may lose relationships and access to information, 
others may improve their position and gain from the original network deficiency. The 
departure of a person at a leadership position at the top of the networked hierarchy may 
lead to a series of promotions in the organization, implying minimal impact since the 
only position requiring replacement and training is that of the lowest or least specialized 
position within the organization. Change of personnel in positions of leadership and 
centrality, can also lead to the positive effect of organizational adaptation.93 This can 
occur by way of persons moving into positions of greater authority where they are able to 
implement ideas, or it may simply serve to signal a need for reorientation by the 
organization. 
Conflict is one of the sufficient conditions for an individual leaving an 
organization. Although organizations tend to attempt to mediate or work through conflict 
situations, many conflicts are difficult to resolve since they involve a fundamental 
difference in values or ideology. Whether the source of conflict is task oriented or 
personal, the departure of one of the conflicting parties can actually reduce or resolve 
conflict in the organization.94 Staw remarks, "In political and religious organizations, for 
example, conflict among the organization's membership is likely to persist and detract 
from collective solidarity and purpose. Conflict in these organizations is usually resolved 
only by the departure of a minority, perhaps setting up its own autonomous organization 
or splinter group."95 Similarly, the departure of unpopular individuals, particularly those 
in positions of leadership or influence, can lead to an overall increase of morale.96  
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III. WHY LEADERSHIP AND IDEOLOGY MATTER 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
As the preceding discussion regarding social networks established, positions 
within an organization are not equal in terms of ties and importance. In particular, leaders 
play important roles in organizations and are more closely identified with an organization 
and more central in its social network. Because of this, their ability to influence those 
under their charge will be affected by the organization’s overall success. This aspect of 
leadership is particularly relevant to the study of how the effects on an organization will 
differ based on who the individual is that decides to disengage.  
Because of the relationship between leadership and performance, there are certain 
stages in the organization’s lifecycle during which leaders are more important and have 
relatively greater influence than others. These are times during which targeting 
disengagement at organizational leadership is likely to be a more beneficial strategy. 
Drawing from the concepts of social comparison and social influence previously 
introduced, this chapter will describe how individuals become leaders within an 
organization and go on to influence its members. It will then explain the process in which 
an organization’s outcomes are frequently attributed to its leaders regardless of the 
leadership’s actual personal accountability. Lastly, it will consider the impacts of social 
processes on behavior and decision-making in light of ideological influence. 
B.  LEADERSHIP 
1.  Importance of Leadership 
Most importantly, organizational leadership helps give meaning to an 
organization’s activities and what it believes. It defines the institutionalized values that 
guide the behavior of members at all levels.97 Bernard Bass offers the following 
explanation of leadership: “Leadership is an interaction between two or more members of 
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a group that often involves structuring or restructuring of the situation and the 
perceptions and expectations of the members.”98 Similarly, Chester Barnard asserts that 
the leadership must create in its membership a universal awareness and belief in the 
organization’s purpose. The organization’s ability to endure is contingent on leadership’s 
ability to establish a common sense of the purpose and a determined and principled effort 
to achieve it.99 This necessitates the shaping of goal compatibility between the leader and 
the led if it is not already present in the mind of the follower. This is paramount since 
goal alignment allows the follower to effectively submit to the influence of a leader.100 In 
the context of an insurgency campaign, goal alignment is expected to occur throughout 
the organization’s networked hierarchy to the extent that individual insurgents are 
volunteer members and have not been coerced into joining.  
Through the lens of organization behavior, there is little consensus concerning 
what good leadership entails and how it functions to achieve a desired effect101—if it is 
able to do so at all since even when a leader is able to exercise a significant amount of 
control over an organization’s activities, many environmental factors remain out of the 
leader’s control.102 Nonetheless, leadership can impact the organization with its ability to 
affect the psychosocial processes of its members. This implies that an assessment of 
leadership’s importance must account for the ability to impart purpose and meaning into  
 
 
                                                 
98 Bernard M. Bass and Ralph Melvin Stogdill, Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, 
Research, and Managerial Applications, New York: The Free Press, 1990. 
99 Chester Irving Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1968. 
100 T. A. Kochan, S. M. Schmidt, and T. A. DeCotiis, “Superior-Subordinate Relations: Leadership 
and Headship,” Human Relations, Vol. 28 (1975), 279–294.  
101 Mary Ann Glynn and Rich DeJordy, 2010, “Leadership through an Organization Behavior Lens: A 
Look at the Last Half-century of Research,” In Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice: An HBS 
Centennial Colloquium on Advancing Leadership, edited by Nitin Nohria and Rakesh Khurana, 119–157, 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 119. 
102 Jeffrey Pfeffer, “The Ambiguity of Leadership,” The Academy of Management Review 2, no. 1 
(January 1977): 107. 
  29
the overall organizational experience.103 It must have the ability to influence how 
individuals perceive the implications and interpretations of certain events in the 
organization.104  
2.  Authority, Power, and Influence 
Generally, individuals holding high-ranking positions are viewed to be in 
possession of institutionalized power.105 Charles Fombrun asserts that influence is 
attributed to formal position, rank, and status more than it is to network location.106 That 
being said, others contend the contrary is true—power is ultimately constrained by an 
individual’s location and personal connections in the organizational network. Rosabeth 
Kanter was one who argued that power is determined by the position, not the person,107 
and Morgan McCall pointed to the significance of “being in the right place.”108 The most 
significant members in a network are usually located in strategic positions109 that provide 
them with relatively greater degrees of power and influence.110 The social network 
locations that exhibit these traits are those characterized by a measure known as 
centrality.  
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3.  Network Centrality 
Introduced in the previous chapter, the measure of an individual’s centrality helps 
situate the notion of leadership in the context of social networks. Central actors are those 
in a network that tend to have access to, and control, more information and resources 
because of their alignment with the organization’s ideals. This information, along with 
more influential positions and ties to the network’s dominant coalition, allows leaders at 
all levels to be more powerful.111 They usually have access to information from the 
organization’s upper level leaders, as well as relevant knowledge they obtain from other 
network members that they can pass back to higher levels of leadership.112  
4.  Leadership’s Social Influence  
When an organization selects individuals to serve in formal leadership positions, 
it is likely to select persons whose ideals and attributes closely reflect those valued by the 
organization.113 In addition to their central location in the network, leaders are also able 
to exercise the greatest degree of influence and persuade other members based on their 
prototypicality. A prototypical individual is one who is relatively more representative of 
the organization’s behavioral norms and values. Owing to their increased influence and 
representative traits and behavior, they provide group members with a set of 
expectations.114 
Likewise, once selected for a position of leadership, the organization and its 
members will give their expectations for proper conduct.115 In fact, the success of a 
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leader is often contingent on her/his ability to fulfill their followers’ expected standard.116 
Subordinates, peers, and superiors all pressure an individual to conform to their 
expectations.117 Through the process of social influence, perceived similarity among a 
group or organization’s members leads to more similar behavior in terms of shared norms 
and values. This has the effect of producing consensual expectations among members. 
The importance of these is reinforced to the extent they are confirmed.  
However, when disagreement occurs, doubt arises concerning the validity of 
certain judgments. Either the group, or each of its individual members, must subsequently 
resolve this conflict.118 Since persons in positions of leadership are selected for 
ideological alignment and perceived to represent ideal values and behavior in an 
organization, their response will be more valued yet closely scrutinized should it 
disconfirm member expectations. That being said, there are times when the judgment of 
leaders may be given relatively more or less credence than others.  
5.  Attribution Theory 
Recognizing what leadership and leaders mean to an organization and its 
members, it is necessary to consider how the perceptions of leaders and the success of the 
organization relate to one another. Bobby Calder and Jeffrey Pfeffer contend that 
leadership is used to explain events and outcomes in organizations in a process of 
attribution.119 This is one of the ways in which individuals make sense of the world 
around them and hope to feel as if they have some control over that world.120  
Individuals identify certain organizational roles as leadership positions. Doing so 
helps inform their interpretation of what events mean by attributing responsibility for 
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outcomes to those positions and the actions of the individuals occupying them. This 
provides them with a simpler view of reality; even when causality for a certain event is a 
result of a complex set of interactions, attributing leadership is straightforward.121 This 
tendency is sometimes even more prevalent when actual events do not align with what an 
individual expects to happen.122  
The phenomena described above point to what Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich 
refer to as the romance of leadership. They maintain that, “as observers of and 
participants in organizations, we may have developed highly romanticized, heroic views 
of leadership—what leaders do, what they are able to accomplish, and the general effects 
they have on our lives.”123 Leaders come to be viewed as symbols of the organization 
they represent.124 A distinct process occurs in the minds of members whereby the degree 
of organizational success or failure determines how the leaders of an organization are 
perceived. Individuals assume that effective leadership must be present when they 
observe an organization performing at a high level, and that the reverse is also true.  
In fact, this conception of leadership finds its greatest appeal when outcomes are 
extreme. When an organization performs either very poorly or very well, individuals 
show a tendency to explain it in terms of how the leadership is performing.125 The degree 
of emphasis placed on leadership is directly related to performance outcomes in either 
direction. As positive and negative performance outcomes become larger, the extent to 
which they are attributed to leadership, compared to other possible explanations, also 
increases.126 Cameron, Kim, and Whetten discovered that members of organizations in a 
state of decline show significantly more leader scapegoating, low morale, and loss of 
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leader credibility than in states of growth.127 That being said, leaders are not simply a 
target of blame or altogether vulnerable just because an organization is not performing as 
it had previously.  
6.  Leadership in Crisis 
Arguably, for the best leader, it is at such a time that it is most vital for them to 
symbolize the organization’s resiliency and give meaning and focus for the 
organization’s future. During times of crisis when the viability of an organization is 
threatened, its members desire strong leadership and a well-defined vision for an 
improved future. They will submit to the influence of a leader who is able to display 
confidence and provide a vision that not only confers understanding of the present, but 
reassures them of a promising future.128 Most members of an organization, particularly at 
lower levels, are not in a position to appraise potential courses and outcomes when 
adversity is encountered,129 nor do they expect their lower level leaders to convey an 
overarching vision.130 Instead, they look for a leader whose character, strength, and skill 
provide promise for future resurgence.131 Frequently, these qualities are found in 
charismatic leaders. This type of leader often plays an important role in successful 
insurgency campaigns, as well as other anti-social movements. According to Edward 
Shils, a leader of this sort is perceived to possess a charismatic quality that,  
…lies in what is thought to be his connection with some very central 
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centrality is constituted by its formative power in initiating, creating, 
governing, transforming, maintaining, or destroying what is vital in man’s 
life.132  
Charismatic leadership can also be defined in terms of its impact on members of 
an organization. It results in 1) making the followers’ self-esteem dependent on the 
mission given by the leader, 2) the followers’ internalization of—and personal or moral 
commitment to—the values and goals as defined by the leader, 3) and the follower’s 
placement of the organization above self-interests. Finally, a charismatic leader often 
seeks to fulfill the vision and promise of organizations that emerge from an ideology, the 
impact of which will be considered later. 133 
C.  GROWTH AND DECLINE 
An insurgent leader’s ability to influence fighters seemingly benefits from the 
insurgency’s growth and success, but is arguably most vital to the insurgency’s survival 
when it is declining, and during times when it is most challenged or experiencing crisis. 
Given the significance of leadership attribution, as well as the extent to which growth has 
an impact on an organization’s ability to achieve its objectives, attention must be given to 
the various explanations and states of organizational growth. Organizations grow for a 
variety of reasons. The literature offers three general explanations.134 The first reason for 
growth is as a result of increased demand for that which the organization produces—this 
helps secure the future viability of the organization. Second, growth is sought as it 
facilitates increased internal management. The increased resources that accompany 
growth more easily enable the organization to obtain commitment to its goals and 
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priorities from various other persons and groups.135 The third explanation offers that 
organizations seek growth to become more secure in light of an uncertain environment 
and external factors of control.136 
The opposite trend, organizational decline, is characterized by a decrease in an 
organization’s resource base over time. The literature on organizational decline 
consistently indicates that it is marked by a variety of events that undermine 
organizational effectiveness and lower member satisfaction and dedication.137 
Additionally, the dysfunctional characteristics of decline inherently involve inadequate 
resources and pressures to make cuts. As a result, persons and groups within the 
organization are left with a smaller resource base over which to contend, a circumstance 
that frequently precipitates interpersonal and inter-unit conflict as they seek to protect 
their own interests.138 Collectively, these effects serve to diminish morale in the 
organization.139  
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D.  IDEOLOGY 
1.  Importance of Ideology 
One of the most important factors for an insurgency campaign is the presence and 
shared strength of belief in an ideology by its leaders and members. Ideology can have 
varying degrees of importance and influence, depending on the organization and its goals. 
The extent to which ideological matters impact the importance of organizational 
leadership, and the way in which the strength of the membership’s belief in an ideology 
affects disengagement, are the final elements that are considered in this chapter. 
Ideology is another factor to consider in determining the importance of leadership. 
David Galula emphasizes that in an insurgency campaign, the movement’s leadership 
relies on a well-grounded cause that is used to mobilize support among the population.140 
The importance of ideology to the organization enhances the overall significance of 
leadership. Ideology helps an insurgent organization define objectives and its strategy for 
attaining them, by way of attachment of influence, “to an idea, a doctrine, or a creed.”141 
The next section considers the manner in which ideology affects group and organizational 
processes. 
2.  Ideological Thresholds  
Even where ideology is important, social comparison and social influence affect 
individual decision-making and behavior. Mark Granovetter considered how social 
processes affect decision-making in a group of individuals with varying levels of 
ideological commitment. With the notion of individual participation thresholds, he 
accounted for differences in ideological conviction and cost/benefit assessments as he 
answered for the power of group processes. Specifically, Granovetter examined diffusion 
of behavior among individuals with various thresholds for joining a riot. When 
contemplating whether or not to riot, he discovered each person to be more or less 
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inclined based on varying degrees of ideological commitment and risk aversion. Seeing 
others riot, however, lessened a reluctant individual’s perceived costs while raising their 
perceived benefits. Accordingly, individual willingness to risk the behavior was 
strengthened. In this way, each individual can be portrayed as having a threshold—the 
number of fellow members required to join in a potentially costly behavior.142 
This model helps depict how ideology weighs in the minds of individuals as they 
consider what others are doing in the context of ideology and potential costs and benefits 
for a given set of choices. It demonstrates the existence of social contagion within a 
group even when ideological factors are involved. When the state alters the cost and 
benefit equation for an insurgent—either through elevating the potential costs of staying 
in the insurgency, or raising the benefits of disengagement by way of credible 
inducements—it helps to offset the influences of ideology. An inverse of the joining  
process can be expected as the insurgency loses momentum. In turn, the state becomes 
more legitimate, and disengagement programs can start to peel away layers of less 
committed participants.  
3.  Relevance of Shared Values 
Ideology also impacts group processes and affects the functionality of an 
organization. That is to say, ideology affects how an organization responds when network 
ties are altered or altogether severed—when members leave and unfamiliar replacements 
arrive. The significant role that values play in business organizations helps bring this to 
light. Values are similar to, and likely a significant aspect of, ideology. They are a 
fundamental feature of an organization in that they provide a foundation for informing 
acceptable behavior.143 The presence of a high degree of shared values indicates that all 
levels of an organization feel the same objectives are important. To the extent they are 
central and shared, values have a significant impact on individual members as they help 
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individuals perceive and make similar sense of events144 and can cause members to feel 
greater investment in the organization’s mission and purpose.145 Most importantly from 
the perspective of the organization, those individuals whose values most closely align 
with the organization have been shown to be more committed and satisfied,146 identify 
more with the organization,147 and have a fewer intentions to leave.148 
Watrous, Huffman, and Pritchard studied the extent to which various degrees of 
shared values affected performance as organizations progressed after experiencing 
turnover. While it might be expected that this condition would galvanize a work unit 
during an adverse period of turnover, they discovered that a high degree of shared values 
actually increased the negative impact of turnover on performance. Performance likely 
suffered because the lack of shared values in the new members resulted in a loss of social 
capital. Conversely, the replacement of higher-level leaders resulted in increased 
performance when a high degree of shared values was present. These differing outcomes 
point to the importance of proximity and the cohesive potential of values. Despite making 
acceptance of new members more challenging, shared values seem to allow members to 
persevere in a state of adversity where their immediate networks weren’t directly 
impacted. Watrous et al also considered the possibility that the turnover of leaders is 
viewed to be a reflection of the organization’s stability and values become more 
important when there is instability.149 To the extent that a degree of shared values is 
present and turnover is distant, a work unit is better able to cope with instability.  
The demonstrated importance of values once again reinforces the idea that 
altering or severing network ties that are closest is detrimental to the commitment of 
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individual members in an organization, as well as to the overall functioning of the 
network. Although the cohesive value of ideology in an insurgency cannot be disputed, 
this further strengthens the notion that severing network relationships can be leveraged to 
obtain wide-ranging effects among individuals and the overall functioning of the 
insurgency campaign.  
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IV. WHAT WILL THE ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE WHEN 
ITS MEMBERS DISENGAGE? 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important goals of any counterinsurgency is to provide security 
to the people by way of reducing the threat of violence to the population. Regardless of 
its target population and strategy, disengagement seeks to contribute to this effort by 
reducing the insurgency’s capacity to commit violence. As a disengagement program 
removes fighters from an insurgency, it undermines human and social capital, as well as 
the organization’s leaders and ideology. When these effects coalesce with the 
psychosocial processes in individual members, the effects become contagious across 
social networks and help further weaken the insurgency. If disengagement is to contribute 
to a successful counterinsurgency effort in this manner, I contend the most efficient 
strategies should adhere to the principles that follow. 1) Disengagement by low-level 
members of an insurgency campaign helps to reduce levels of violence by decreasing its 
capacity to conduct operations. 2) Disengagement programs will be more effective and 
contagion effects will be more widespread when an insurgency campaign is in a state of 
decline; 3) Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects more 
widespread in an insurgency campaign when the state is perceived to be legitimate. 
Finally, 4) disengagement by high-ranking leaders of an insurgency campaign has greater 
consequences for the organization than disengagement by low-level members. 
B.  DISENGAGEMENT’S EFFECTS ON INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS 
1. Disengagement by Low-Level Members  
Disengagement by low-level members of an insurgency campaign helps to reduce 
levels of violence by decreasing its capacity to conduct operations. Irrespective of the 
internal and external dynamics of an insurgency campaign, disengagement strategies can 
be employed to reduce its capacity to commit violence. The removal of fighters from the 
organization undermines human capital upfront. In turn, this reduces social capital and 
creates further challenges to organizational effectiveness. The initial loss, that of human 
  42
capital, occurs when individuals leave an insurgency and take with them knowledge and 
skills. Insurgents who have a greater degree of specialization, and those that have 
leadership responsibilities and are more influential are the ones whose removal will 
creates the greatest amount of disruption in the insurgency’s operations. The acquired 
technical and tactical abilities of an insurgent are not replaced easily; simply increasing 
investment in recruiting is not likely to compensate for their loss. Therefore, an attempt to 
replace human capital at any level requires time and can be very difficult. As a result, the 
insurgency’s overall capacity to generate violence is diminished in the short term, and 
potentially in the long term.  
More significantly—especially at the lower level—the exit of fighters from an 
insurgency negatively alters the organization’s social fabric. In an organization, certain 
individuals hold more social capital than others. To the extent that relationships are 
consistent, behavioral familiarity results among members and helps create trust and 
interaction norms. The element of trust is particularly important to the functioning of the 
organization because it lowers potential transaction costs. This notion of trust is 
particularly salient for members of covert and illicit groups since it is necessary for 
personal and operational security and efficient operations more broadly. When members 
of trusted networks choose to disengage from violence, insurgent networks must adapt 
and replace missing actors in order to continue operations. The trust, however, will not be 
immediately replaced.  
When lost, social capital is more difficult to replace that human capital. 
Expressive network relationships are more slowly and deliberately replaced, limiting the 
organization’s collective social capital and effectiveness until trusted relationships with 
actors occupying new positions are able to develop. Trust and security among members 
will be further weakened as more fighters disengage. Insurgents who continue to fight 
will fear that disengaged fighters will give the state intelligence in exchange for 
additional inducements. Finally, disengagement promises to undermine trust by 
increasing opportunities for infiltration, either real or perceived, as new members are 
recruited to replace those that left and as old members return to fight after imprisonment.  
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2. Disengagement and Insurgency Life Cycle 
Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects will be 
more widespread when an insurgency campaign is in a state of decline. In a state of 
organizational decline, an insurgency campaign experiences a relative decrease in its 
capacity to present a viable alternative to the state. This decrease might be caused by 
increased effectiveness of state security forces, reduced support from the population and 
other resource providers, or realization by current members that an organization’s goals 
are unattainable or at least less preferred to what the government or another group 
promises. Decline diminishes the insurgency’s legitimacy, as well as organizational 
operations and overall objectives. The insurgency campaign’s diminished ability to 
mobilize resource support in the form of fighters, weapons, and finances erodes its 
capacity to provide security and other services it previously provided the population. The 
degree to which an organization declines is likely to affect the general population and 
influence its willingness to provide resources, intelligence, and protection, as well as new 
members. Finally, as the movement becomes less effective, it produces lower levels of 
member satisfaction and dedication.  
To the extent that decline becomes apparent and the insurgency appears to 
weaken, insurgents begin to consider other alternatives. When the state provides a viable 
way out of the insurgency, fighters are more likely to disengage since it is increasingly in 
their perceived best interests for the future. The consideration of alternatives is 
particularly salient for low-level members and those less committed ideologically—those 
who do not embody the organization’s values and ideals to the extent that more 
committed individuals do.  
Although the significance of ideology typically confuses cost-benefit analysis, it 
is reasonable to expect that such an approach will be most applicable, relatively speaking, 
in this condition. Expectancy-valence theory150 suggests that when people choose to 
make certain decisions or behave in a certain way, they seek to maximize the probability 
of a valued outcome. In other words, they seek to maximize the expected value and 
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probability of expected benefits while minimizing costs. As the insurgency is in decline, 
the reduced availability of resources similarly limits what it can provide its members, as 
well as its capacity to enforce member loyalty. Equally, it is also worth considering that 
the threat of capture to the insurgent is also likely to increase as the insurgency’s 
resources diminish. The option to disengage fills a potential void in the near term as well 
as in the long term and is much more appealing considering the increased possibility of a 
movement’s ultimate demise as it moves progressively through stages of decline.  
It is expected that an insurgency’s decline will create associated skepticism in its 
long-term viability, objectives, and ideology, thus creating a great deal of uncertainty 
among its membership, particularly those at lower levels who have access to less 
information. In the earlier examination of networks, it was learned that expressive 
networks are more important than instrumental networks when individuals make 
decisions concerning values and behavior. As individuals decide to disengage, social 
psychological processes within expressive networks will be significant as individuals 
evaluate future threats and opportunities by way of social comparison. Comparison is 
known to be more important for informing decision-making processes in risky or 
ambiguous situations. This is particularly relevant when an insurgency is in decline and 
the risk of capture is elevated while information about the insurgency’s future is held 
more closely than normal and uncertainty increases.  
This will fuel exponential effects for the organization when one individual’s 
disengagement prompts other members to consider recourse to the insurgency while 
being informed by social comparison and social influence. A phenomenon similar to 
turnover contagion—whereby disengagement by one or more creates a snowball effect 
because of social contagion amongst the insurgency’s members—can be expected to be 
particularly relevant in this condition. During decline, the insurgency has less of a 
capacity to enforce dedication to the campaign in response to alternative inducements 
from the state. For the insurgency overall, the impacts on the stayers and their relative 
tendency toward leaving will be positively related to the number of individuals who 
leave, and will be particularly meaningful for individuals with whom the disengaged 
persons have the strongest and closest network ties. Expansive disengagement that is 
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expected to follow will severely undermine both human and social capital, thus 
amplifying the effects described in the first principle and bringing about an even more 
rapid organizational decline. 
Conversely, enticing insurgents to disengage from violence during a period of 
campaign growth is significantly more challenging. As an insurgency campaign grows, it 
is likely to experience an increased level of legitimacy among its members and the 
population in general. As long as it continues to accumulate resources and grow, these 
outcomes will validate the insurgency’s operations, as well as its ideology and objectives. 
Provided the movement’s ideology and activities remain consistent with the original 
orientation when members first joined, the push or pull factors that lead members to 
disengage will not have to do with the organization. Rather, disengagement in this 
circumstance will more likely be prompted by personal reasons and is not likely to spread 
its appeal to other members in the organization.  
3. Disengagement and State Legitimacy  
Disengagement programs will be more effective and contagion effects more 
widespread in an insurgency campaign when the state is perceived to be legitimate. The 
legitimacy of the state is most relevant in three facets. First, the state must present a set of 
inducements that it is able to credibly deliver to insurgents who disengage. To 
complement these incentives, state security forces must present a credible threat of death 
or imprisonment for those fighters that continue to participate in the insurgency. Finally, 
the state must prove itself to be on the path to being a viable entity that is able to provide 
security and governance for its people.  
These factors are important because psychosocial processes among members are 
likely to reinforce a disengagement program’s success or failure in a virtuous or vicious 
cycle when disengagement program feedback is provided to the fighters remaining in the 
insurgent organization by those that leave first. When contemplating leaving an 
insurgency campaign, an individual’s observation of similar others leaving provides them 
with information about the threats and opportunities that exist outside the organization. 
This is particularly relevant for the embedded individual who wants to understand what is 
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potentially lost and gained by leaving. This sacrifice can consist of loss of benefits an 
organization provides, like pay and the social support of fellow members. The greater the 
overall loss stands to be, the more difficult it will be for the individual to disengage.  
Cumulative effects can be expected to occur to the extent that the state offers 
viable opportunities that are deemed legitimate. The state must take care to ensure the 
phenomena of social comparison work in its favor. It must make certain that 
disengagement programs are deemed credible in terms of promised inducements and do 
not pose an unrealistic threat to those who participate. To the extent that this does not 
occur, those remaining in the organization will be less enticed to replicate the decision of 
others in their expressive networks.  
Constant evaluation of the threats and opportunities that accompany the option to 
continue fighting also takes place in the minds of insurgents. This process, too, is 
informed by social comparison. The most relevant observation is the real or perceived 
threat of capture or injury, and the severity of imprisonment and punishment for those 
who are taken into custody by state security forces. This makes obvious the importance 
credible threats from the state have in complementing disengagement programs in order 
to make any strategy as effective as possible.  
4. Disengagement and Rank of Members 
Disengagement by high-ranking leaders of an insurgency campaign has greater 
consequences for the organization than disengagement by low-level members. Enjoying 
greater influence due to position within the insurgency, a leader—one who is expected to 
embody the campaign’s values and ideal behavior, and have increased access to 
information—by disengaging, provokes questioning of the organization’s ideological 
foundation and the attainability of its objectives. Owing to the influence of the leader’s 
position and deviation from expected behavior, other members are more likely to also 
disengage from violence.  
The insurgent organization selects individuals who reflect the ideals, behavior, 
and attributes valued by the organization to serve in leadership positions. Most 
significantly, these persons are also chosen for their ideological alignment with the 
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organization. To the extent that leaders represent model prototypicality, they are able to 
exercise the greatest degree of influence among the insurgency’s fighters. For these 
reasons, they are usually placed in central positions within the network. These positions 
tend to give them greater access to and control over information, as well as closer ties to 
the dominant coalition in the organization. Together, these characteristics reinforce their 
perceived power and influence.  
Leaders are especially important in an insurgency since they symbolize the 
organization and create in its members a shared understanding and belief in its purpose 
and the ideology that is its foundation. They help to define the values and ideals that 
guide the behavior of members at all levels and the organization as a whole. Through 
these functions, as well as through more routine actions, insurgent leaders give fighters a 
sense of purpose and meaning to what they do and the sacrifices they make. To the extent 
that a leader is able to do these things to guide a determined effort, it will help the 
insurgency thrive.  
Along with the responsibilities above, peers, subordinates, and superiors place 
expectations on leaders in an insurgent network. These expectations are particularly 
relevant to subordinates when disagreement occurs among members of an insurgent 
network and doubt arises concerning which individual judgments are valid. For the 
insurgency’s members, the process through which they attempt to resolve this conflict 
will tend to value and more closely scrutinize leaders. This will be particularly salient 
when leaders disconfirm member expectations of prototypicality. Such is the case when a 
leader disengages from violence.  
Leader disengagement also has other significant representative impacts for other 
members in the organization. To a great extent, these occur because of the access to 
information and other key organizational members that accompany a leader’s centrally 
located position in the insurgent network. As mentioned, the ideological alignment and 
prototypicality of individuals in leadership positions is what permits them to be trusted 
with formal authority and more closely held knowledge. For members, disengagement by  
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an actor with these characteristics is perceived to imply they have relevant information 
that has created in them dissatisfaction with the organization and/or its future and thus led 
them to leave.  
That being said, this activity will not have the same impacts during a state of 
decline as it does during periods of growth because of the process of attribution. 
Recalling from the examination of attribution in the previous chapter, leadership is used 
by an insurgency’s members to explain events, particularly when they do not align with 
expectations. Regardless of actual causes, individuals tend to assign personal 
accountability for organizational outcomes in order to feel in control. For that reason, the 
ability of leaders to influence followers is closely related to the insurgency’s success.  
Organizational successes and failures are not only attributed to leaders, but alter 
member perceptions of leadership in the same direction the insurgency is trending. 
Leaders in an insurgency can be expected to enjoy greater influence during periods of 
growth and their disengagement will lead to impacts for other members in the 
organization. That being said, the overall strength and success of the organization will 
prevent these effects from being significantly detrimental. As a result, the most 
opportunistic strategy to employ to take advantage of a leader who wants to disengage is 
not that of individual disengagement, but collective disengagement guided by that leader, 
on the largest scale possible.  
Conversely, given that effective leadership is expected to translate into 
organizational success, leaders who are associated with decline are deemed ineffective 
and experience diminished credibility and influence. Their perceived responsibility for 
decline diminishes the social psychological influence they have over other members. 
Concern over the legitimacy of ideological matters that is caused, and/or exacerbated, by 
decline further leads to distrust of institutional authority and the behavior of leaders in the 
organization. In this instance, leader disengagement will not be significant because of the 
influence, but because it reinforces the observed decline in the insurgency’s ability to 
conduct violence.  
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The exception to the reactions anticipated above is that of the charismatic leader. 
This type of leader will be relied upon even more, not less, during periods of crisis. 
Rather than be subject to diminished levels of influence—owing to the importance for a 
leader to provide meaning and direction to followers—the most inspirational and 
effective leaders will be relied upon to guide their organizations out of dark times. If they 
are unable to respond positively to member and organizational expectations and instead 
choose to disengage, however, it will have massive repercussions. For individual fighters, 
the corresponding effects will be even more salient than if it was a more normal leader 
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V.  CASE STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM 
INSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine three cases of disengagement programs being 
employed as part of larger and more comprehensive counterinsurgency campaigns. Each 
case will be analyzed to determine the specific strategies employed by the programs, their 
effectiveness in reducing levels of violence, and consideration of social contagion effects. 
Specifically, the dependent variable, the violent attacks conducted by the insurgency, will 
be measured against the independent variable, insurgent disengagement from violence. 
Finally, intervening variables that have not been analyzed but might be particularly 
relevant will be considered, along with specific lessons learned. The case studies will 
include disengagement programs in Vietnam, Malaya, and Afghanistan. 
B.  VIETNAM WAR CASE STUDY 
1.  Description  
During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese government (GVN) offered 
opportunities for defection to Viet Cong (VC) insurgents and North Vietnamese Army 
soldiers through its Chieu Hoi Program. Meaning ‘open arms,’ the program served as an 
alternative to the hardships of guerrilla life as it also strived to politically indoctrinate 
former enemies and offered vocational training.151 Beginning in 1963, it sought to 
weaken the insurgency over the course of the war as it accounted for the defection of 
194,000 insurgents—known as ‘ralliers’ or Choi Han. It attempted to further weaken 
insurgent support through public rejection of the National Liberation Front’s objectives 
by former adherents who had become Choi Han.152 VC insurgents were eligible to  
                                                 
151 J. A. Koch, RAND Corporation, and United States, Advanced Research Projects Agency, The 
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participate in the program by way of surrender or upon being taken prisoner. NVA 
soldiers, on the other hand, could not be given Hoi Chanh status unless they 
surrendered.153  
The program’s three principles were National Community, National Concord, and 
National Progress.154 In addition to amnesty and financial support for themselves and 
their families,155 defectors could voluntarily take part in rewards programs for turning in 
weapons, providing information about enemy personnel and resources, and influencing 
the defection of other insurgents. In the spirit of reconciliation, these programs were 
strictly optional, but carried with them significant financial appeal.156 In 1967, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky further increased the incentive for defection with a new policy 
of “Dai Doan Ket.” With the objective of appealing to high-ranking VC, this program 
advanced a policy of National Reconciliation that promised to assist defectors in 
obtaining careers commensurate with their ability and experience while still providing 
them amnesty and complete political and civil rights.157  
2.  Effectiveness 
The motives for most Choi Han had to do with personal reasons, and not 
ideology. In fact, interviews with defectors showed general ignorance concerning formal 
Marxism.158 Chief among the factors prompting defection were the GVN’s military 
effectiveness, an unsettled and rugged life in the insurgency, limited freedom and 
constant supervision, uncertainty over their future, disillusionment with the VC’s policies 
and ability to liberate South Vietnam, and an elevated perception of the GVN and the 
credibility of its Chieu Hoi promises.159 For the most part, defection in these instances 
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could not be viewed as support for the GVN. Rather, defectors maintained belief in 
certain aspects of the insurgency, but their Marxist indoctrination was not sufficient 
enough to overcome personal interests and the thought of a protracted campaign.  
Additionally, with few exceptions, almost all Choi Han came from lower levels in 
the insurgency’s ranks.160 High-ranking members were viewed to have made a 
psychological break with their former lives and were fully committed to their cause.161 
Their conviction was supposedly accompanied by an ardent belief in an inevitable victory 
that became vital to their self-identity.162 From these members’ perspective, personal 
sacrifice had to be accompanied by political justification in order to be sufficient to cause 
them to defect.163 In interviews with 166 defectors, the average period of service for 
volunteers was 36 months, while those defectors who had been coerced to join the 
insurgency only served an average of 7.5 months prior to defecting.164 This indicates that 
those who volunteered—those whose member loyalty and ideological commitment were 
the strongest—were the most difficult to attract by the Chieu Hoi Program. Likewise, 
enticing the most high-ranking and hard-core of the VC was challenging since they 
feared retribution from the government and a loss of status if they left the insurgency. 
Recognizing this, as well as the relative importance of these members, the National 
Reconciliation campaign mentioned above aimed to compensate for the economic and 
status losses that were perceived to accompany exit from the insurgency.165  
3.  Quantitative Analysis  
The Chieu Hoi Program recognized the significance of high-ranking members of 
the Viet Cong and NVA to the enemy’s Marxist ideology, and therefore sought to 
encourage their disengagement. Although it was unsuccessful in appealing to high- 
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ranking insurgents, the GVN managed to effectively appeal to low-ranking insurgents 
and had an adverse affect on the Viet Cong and NVA insurgency and its ability to 
commit violence and recruit members. 
In Figure 1, an analysis of the correlation between the disengagement of low-
ranking members and VC attacks shows a positive relationship between disengagement 
and the insurgency’s growth. This suggests the Chieu Hoi campaign was mildly 
successful in combating the insurgency by removing a significant number of insurgents 
from the battlefield. Because Viet Cong and NVA disengaged for mostly personal 
reasons and their leaving did not represent any real dissatisfaction with the organization 
and its objectives, the cascading effects on the rest of the organization were insignificant. 
Accordingly, disengagement behavior neither spread nor was it unable to have 
significantly detrimental consequences for the overall insurgency.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the Insurgency in 
Vietnam (1965–1971)166 
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The period surrounding the 1968 Tet offensive represents a unique relationship 
that is not found elsewhere in the course of the Chieu Hoi program in Vietnam. Namely, 
a period of decline in the insurgency accompanied a period of increased disengagement. 
It is now known that the effects of the 1968 Tet offensive were significant for the NVA 
and the VC. Operations made defection more difficult immediately following Tet, but by 
April 1968, the number of defectors began to increase when enemy combatants realized 
the Marxist insurgency had failed to achieve the Tet goals to incite a popular uprising and 
hold territory after the offensive was complete. At the same time, the GVN had expanded 
its presence and control in the countryside. Given that 42% of 1968’s defections occurred 
during the final three months of the year, it is plausible these were a reflection of the 
perceptions the defectors had concerning the condition of insurgency, as well as the 
overall success of Tet.167  
Although there are no reliable figures available and evidence is anecdotal, it 
should be recognized that MACV reported a distinct increase in the rank of defectors 
during this period.168 It is interesting to note that the defection rate the following year 
was nearly double the program’s second highest annual rate. Even though this was 
partially because of the unsettled outcome of Tet as mentioned above, it is possible that 
the rate was intensified further by increased defection by high-ranking members. Such a 
phenomenon would indicate alignment by low-level defectors with those insurgent 
leaders that believed the insurgency was increasingly susceptible to defeat at the time.169 
Finally, it should be noted that enemy attacks demonstrate an appreciable period of 
decline from 1969 onward. It is safe to assume the reason this was not matched by an 
appreciable rise in disengagement due to the fact that initiation of Vietnamization and 
U.S. withdrawal hinted at capitulation and diminished the enemy’s need to exert 
influence through attacks. 
A comparative analysis of annual growth rates of the program, shown in Figure 2, 
provides insight into the effects of social contagion among VC at the macro level. From 
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year to year, the number of disengaged VC fluctuated somewhat significantly, indicating 
the relative popularity of the program. In all years, there was at least a 30% change from 
the year prior. The growth in popularity from the previous year was most prominent in 
1966 and 1969. Given that 1966 was the second year of the program, it is likely that the 
program appealed to the least committed of the VC during this time—those who hoped to 
obtain rewards to alleviate the economic hardships that had motivated them to join the 
insurgency in the first place. The second year of extraordinary popularity was 1969. This 
was likely due to the Tet offensive and the heavy fighting, losses, and extreme conditions 
to which it subjected VC fighters but had simultaneously made disengaging in 1968 
much more difficult. As hypothesized, the social contagion effects were not particularly 
salient beyond these years because the reasons for disengaging were more personal and 
did not have to do with the insurgency campaign.  
 
Figure 2.   Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Insurgency in Vietnam  
(1965–1971) 
Inherently, the VC and NVA understood the potential significance of social 
contagion from Cheiu Hoi since they considered defection to be an offense punishable by 
death.170 The threats of high-ranking disengagement and social contagion were guarded  
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against throughout the war, albeit anecdotally, by enemy political cadres promptly 
responding to the defection of any high-ranking VC with intense and severe periods of 
reindoctrination.171 
4.  Observations 
Ultimately, the GVN’s inherent distrust of the program and understandable 
reluctance to reward their former enemies kept the program from reaching its full 
potential. Lack of support by GVN was further attributed to the view that it was a 
program being pushed on them by the U.S.172 Interviews with Hoi Chanh around 1967 
revealed that many VC considered defection but the credibility of the program prevented 
them from doing so as they feared they wouldn’t be able to provide for their families.173 
The perceived impact of offer’s credibility was reinforced by the increase in defection 
after the U.S. began to offer funding in 1967.174 
The case of the Cheiu Hoi program in Vietnam amplifies the importance of state 
stability for any disengagement program. In 1971, the defection rate slowed to its lowest 
levels since inception. This was likely a function of the GVN’s instability because of 
upcoming Presidential elections. At the same time, propaganda and U.S. advisory efforts 
were scaled down;175 all further reduced the appeal and effectiveness of Cheiu Hoi. This 
suggests an important intervening variable to be analyzed when determining the appeal of 
a disengagement program.  
Since the insurgency’s success is a function of both its growth condition and the 
potency of the state, it is necessary to also take into account the viability of the state’s 
institutions, as well as its capacity to provide governance and security for the population. 
The state’s economic stability and opportunities are also relevant to the extent they are 
likely to provide a defector with alternative means of success in society. In Vietnam, 
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there was a negative correlation between the stability and continuity of the political 
leadership and incidents of defection. This relationship can be observed in the correlation 
of monthly defectors with political developments in Figure 3  
 
Figure 3.   Correlation of Monthly Defectors, 1963–1967,  
with Political Developments176 
The Vietnamese Cheiu Hoi program offers several insights into the potential of 
disengagement programs. In order to prevent the former fighters from turning back to the 
insurgency to provide for their family, the program sought to use defectors’ military skills 
and knowledge of enemy forces to enhance the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency 
forces. Most notably, the Kit Carson Scout program was a voluntary one that employed 
defectors alongside U.S. forces. Defected members of the enemy served as scouts 
embedded in U.S. units and provided invaluable expertise concerning the language, 
terrain, and enemy tactics.177 In addition, the third party inducement program provided 
economic incentives for insurgents to leverage their influence to advance social 
contagion in their respective expressive networks to encourage defection of their allies to 
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the Cheiu Hoi program.178 Lastly, the Cheiu Hoi program seems to have affected the 
supply side of the insurgency through its impact on VC recruitment. This, too, is quite 
possibly a result of social influence as Hoi Chanh settled in villages and contagion effects 
fueled by shared testimony of the ominous conditions as a fighter in the insurgency.179  
C.  MALAYAN EMERGENCY CASE STUDY 
1.  Description 
When the British returned to Malaya to reestablish control of the country as 
World War II came to a close, they discovered the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese 
Army (MPAJA) had control in many areas of the country. In an effort resembling 
collective disengagement, the British Military Government met with MPAJA leadership 
to negotiate its disbandment and disarmament. They made the appeal to the MPAJA that 
a peaceful settlement would afford them a more promising future than if they elected to 
return to the jungle and wage a guerrilla war. The MPAJA leaders opposed the 
government’s offer and sought to attain either de facto or de jure status as an enduring 
force that would complement, or replace, the Malaya Regiment. However, they made 
significant and rigid demands during negotiations rather than immediately resorting to 
guerrilla warfare. In the end, the disarmament effort failed to deplete the MPAJA of its 
surplus arms and soon after officially disbanding, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) 
replaced the MPAJA with Communist front organizations. These organizations soon 
turned their attention to defeating the government through terror attacks in the form of 
murders and abductions, and eventually to an open insurgency.180 
In an effort to combat the size of the insurgency, as well as the real cost of 
operations conducted to kill insurgent fighters, the Government of Malaya (GOM) 
developed an amnesty program to entice enemy insurgents to stop fighting. In addition to 
amnesty, the GOM’s rewards-for-surrender program offered a bribe for insurgents to 
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defect. Rewards were scaled according to the rank of the insurgent with 8,000 current 
U.S. dollars for a soldier, and $250,000 rewarded for a Central Committee Chairman. 
Additional rewards were given to those who provided information leading to the killing 
or capture of insurgency members. In support of this effort, the GOM’s psychological 
warfare was directed at elevating the surrender rate. Two of its main objectives were to 
ally insurgent fears of maltreatment or being killed by security forces in the process of 
defecting.181 It helped further improve the appeal of the campaign by utilizing the 
surrendered personnel who held an appreciation for the minds of the insurgents.182  
2.  Effectiveness 
When considering defection, the deliberation of many individual insurgents 
required resolving the dilemma of which side was better able to provide protection. 
Therefore, the success of reward-for-surrender program relied on the government’s 
ability to provide security for those that defected. The program took hold slowly after the 
GOM and its security forces proved to be credible and able to provide defectors with 
protection. Additionally, the growing capacity of the various security forces enabled the 
GOM to place ever-increasing amounts of pressure on insurgent forces, thus creating 
uncertainty and anxiety among the organization’s members. As these events converged, it 
produced a large number of insurgent defections, as well as a plethora of intelligence for 
the GOM.183  
All told, 2,702 insurgents surrendered during the course of the campaign, a figure 
that is particularly significant when compared to the total of 6,710 enemy insurgents who 
were killed in action. The impact of the defections extended beyond the removal of 
individual fighters from the battlefield as other insurgents were killed or captured based 
on the intelligence they provided.184 As defector intelligence was acted upon, it increased 
                                                 
181 Komer and United States, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 71–73. 
182 John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1992, 126. 
183 Komer and United States, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 74. 
184 Komer and United States, Malayan Emergency in Retrospect, 74–75. 
  61
the pressure felt by members of the insurgency and profoundly affected morale among 
insurgents. Finally, near the end of 1955, the insurgency realized its efforts had 
culminated as MCP leader Chin Peng made an appeal for peace.185 Later, the GOM’s 
combined pressure on the insurgency and offers of amnesty yielded significant mass 
surrenders in 1957 and 1958.186 
3.  Quantitative Results 
The Malayan program sought to encourage the disengagement of insurgents at all 
levels as evidenced by the scaled rewards for insurgent defection. Although specific data 
regarding the rank of those that participated in the program is not available, the 
effectiveness of disengagement is clearly correlated with the insurgency’s life cycle 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.   Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the  
Malayan Emergency (1948–1954)187 
Figure 4 demonstrates an overall negative relationship between the 
disengagement of Malayan insurgents and the insurgency’s growth. During the initial 
stages of growth for the insurgency, after 1949, there is a consistent relationship between 
the number of insurgents leaving the organization and the campaign’s demonstrated level 
of violence. After peaking in intensity near the end of 1951, the insurgency began a 
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precipitous drop in activity. Simultaneously, the annual rate at which insurgents 
disengaged increased until it reached its apex in 1953. Relative decline in disengagement 
after 1953 can be attributed to the fact that there were fewer fighters remaining to 
disengage, and those left were most ideologically hardcore (see Figure 6). Decline in the 
insurgency overall is evidenced in the reduction of attacks from 450-500 a month at the 
end of 1951 to only 100 by January 1953. Similarly, the monthly rate at which insurgent 
fighters were killed also sharply increased to 70–100 for three consecutive years to the 
end of 1953. A commonly held belief that the insurgency was to soon meet its demise 
become apparent in 1955 when the MCP leader, Chin Peng, made gestures to seek 
peace.188  
Even though causation cannot be established as it is impossible to determine 
whether the GOM’s disengagement program became more appealing as the insurgency 
declined or the insurgency declined as more insurgents disengaged, it can be reasonably 
assumed that the presence of the GOM’s amnesty programs helped facilitate a more rapid 
decline in the insurgency. The way in which this program contributed to the counter-
insurgency effort in Malaya confirms the hypothesized result that disengagement 
programs are more effective during periods of decline, irrespective of target.  
A comparative analysis of annual growth rates of the Malayan program, shown in 
Figure 5, provides an indication of social contagion effects within the insurgency over 
time. Clearly, the popularity spread most at the beginning. However, unlike in Vietnam 
where initial growth was likely a function of the program’s appeal to the less committed, 
this growth rate would seem to be indicative of an extremely significant contagion effect 
in light of the insurgent motivations shown in Figure 6. During the program’s initial 
period, dislike of policy is cited as insurgents’ primary reason for disengaging. This 
appears to confirm the expectation that motivations for leaving that have more to do with 
the organization and less to do with the individual cause will resonate and thus become 
contagious among members in expressive networks. Such a massively significant growth 
from the first year to the second is also likely representative of the feedback provided 
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from the experiences of the insurgents who first accepted amnesty. After 1949, the 
pattern of growth happened as expected. The relative lack of contagion effects was 
represented by negative growth until the insurgency reached the apex of its activity in 
1951. The growth and contagion of the program trended positively from that point until 
1954 when the insurgency reached its lowest point since 1948.  
 
 
Figure 5.   Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Malayan Emergency  
(1949–1955) 
Like the NVA and VC, the MLRA high command took extraordinary measures to 
guard against contagion effects within the insurgency: “checks, controls, and inquisitions 
multiplied; sentries watched sentries; watchers watched everyone.” Beyond the loss 
experienced when insurgents actually disengaged, the guarding against defection for fear 
of its effects resulted in a significant loss of productivity. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the role the program played in the defeat of the insurgency went beyond 
what is expressed in the total number of disengaged fighters.189 
A detailed insight into the motivations of those that disengaged is shown in Figure 
6. This figure shows that the majority of those who defected from the insurgency during 
its growth period, as well as the very beginning of its decline, did so because of dislike of 
the insurgency’s policy. Over time, this figure is diminished. It can be reasoned that the 
most ardent believers in the organization remained members through the insurgency’s 
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decline. They either waited until the campaign’s objectives were increasingly unfavorable 
before accepting the GOM’s offer, or never did disengage, in the case of the hard-core. 
Similarly, it is also interesting to note the rate at which insurgents disengaged because of 
hopelessness increased over time. This reinforces the notion of various levels of 
commitment to the campaign’s ideology and varying individual thresholds, or limits, at 
which individuals choose to longer commit to an organization that appears to have 
unattainable objectives.  
 
Figure 6.   Reasons for Surrender Given by Surrendered Enemy Personnel,  
1949–1955190 
4.  Observations 
When viewed alongside the Vietnamese Cheiu Hoi program, the GOM’s response 
in the Malayan Emergency demonstrates the significance of demonstrated state capacity 
in defeating an insurgency. An examination of the GOM’s security forces shows that part 
time auxiliary police responsible for enhancing security in the villages grew from 17,000 
in 1948, to 47,000 in 1949, and ultimately peaked at 200,000 in 1952. Similarly, the 
capacity of the police and special constable forces grew until 1952—and even beyond 
then, in the case of the police.191 The GOM also incorporated disengaged insurgent 
fighters into the overall security effort. The Special Operations Volunteer Force was 
comprised of 25 member platoons made of surrendered and captured personnel and led 
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by a Police Lieutenant. The disengaged insurgents were volunteers and proved to be 
particularly useful in providing intelligence concerning the activities of the insurgency.192  
Simultaneously, the British helped to limit the appeal of the insurgency by instilling 
people’s confidence in the GOM as they successfully convinced most people that Malaya 
was on the path to early independence.193 
D.  AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY 
1.  Description 
The Afghan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission, also 
known as Programme Tahkim Sulh (PTS), was established in 2005 by presidential decree 
in Afghanistan. The purpose of PTS is “end inter-group armed hostilities, resolve 
unsettled national issues, facilitate healing of the wounds caused by past injustices, and 
take necessary measures to prevent the repeat of the civil war and its destruction.”194 The 
program sought to address what it believed to be some of the root causes of the Taliban 
insurgency’s conflict with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). These included: 1) giving 
inaccurate information to the GIRoA and ISAF that results in action against innocents 
(i.e. settle scores), 2) harsh attitude of the GIRoA and its representatives toward the 
community, 3) lack of economic opportunities resulting in pursuit of illicit means, and 4) 
radicalization attempts by foreign elements in an effort to destabilize Afghanistan.195  
PTS sought to achieve its goals by reaching out to insurgents by way of media 
campaigns and public invitations by the program’s president, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi. 
Regional offices provided insurgents with the opportunity to have face-to-face or 
mediated contact with PTS when considering joining the program. Once an individual 
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decided to disengage from violence and reintegrated through PTS, the program attempted 
to provide jobs, resources, as well as opportunities for safe resettlement.196 Additionally, 
participants in PTS were to receive a safe conduct letter in exchange for their pledge to 
live peacefully and accept the new Afghan constitution.197  
2.  Effectiveness 
As of 2009, 7,106 insurgents joined PTS, and 30% of those also surrendered 
weapons. It also gained the release of 763 prisoners who agreed to join the peace 
process.198 Despite the large number of participants, the effectiveness of the program is 
to be questioned. One of the main reasons for this is that nearly all of the disengaged 
Taliban are low-level fighters; very few are believed to be high ranking or influential 
figures in the insurgency.199 Over a 6-year period from 2001 to the end of 2007, the 
GIRoA only reconciled with 22 “strategically significant” Taliban figures who 
reintegrated into public life. Of these, only three had played a role in the Taliban 
insurgency after 2001. The program has also been criticized for its vague eligibility 
requirements.200 In some areas, it is believed that up to 50% of the participants in the 
PTS program were not legitimate fighters.201  
Affiliation with networks outside the Taliban seems to have been a significant 
factor in their choosing reconciliation. For example, eight of the 22 were known as 
mujahideen commanders before joining with the Taliban. Although data is not available 
regarding the time period during which reconciliation agreements were made with high-
ranking figures, it is known that almost no reconciliation has been reached with top-level 
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leaders since the insurgency’s escalation after 2005. The Afghan National Security 
Council, after its formation in 2002, made an effort to compile various blacklists 
developed by Afghan and U.S. security forces. Their focus narrowed on identification of 
members of the new insurgency. As of 2009, none of the blacklisted individuals had 
sought to come to terms with the government. This provides additional evidence to 
suggest that senior and mid-level insurgents do not presently perceive reconciliation to be 
a desirable option.202  
3.  Quantitative Analysis  
Figure 8 demonstrates a positive relationship between the disengagement of 
Afghan insurgents and the insurgency’s level of violence, followed by a negative 
relationship. As the insurgency was taking hold, the number of insurgents who 
disengaged continued to grow, until 2007. At that time, the insurgency approached 
unprecedented levels of violence and membership growth. Simultaneously, the number of 
persons who opted to disengage declined significantly. Overall, the PTS program appears 
to be have been largely ineffective in limiting violence or spread of the Taliban 
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Figure 7.   Correlation of Disengaged Personnel with Growth of the  
Insurgency in Afghanistan (2005–2009)203 
The effects of social contagion among Afghan insurgents at the macro level are 
revealed through a comparative analysis of annual growth rates of disengaged insurgents, 
shown in Figure 8. The growth in popularity from the previous year was most prominent 
from 2005 to 2006. As this was the first full year of the PTS program, it is likely that the 
least committed of the insurgents joined the program to take advantage of the promises 
economic benefits that may have prompted them to join the insurgency in the first place. 
Social contagion effects beyond this initial year would not have been particularly salient 
beyond these years since economic justification is more personal and not viewed to be an 
objection to the insurgency’s objectives. 
Although the cumulative effects of disengagement were positive and primarily to 
the advantage of the GIRoA from 2005 to 2006, the PTS program became less popular 
between 2007 and 2008 when the insurgency began to gain increased amounts of control. 
According to the UN, the Taliban nearly quadrupled in strength from 2005 to 2009.204 
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Such an increase would have diminished the legitimacy of the GIRoA, and made the PTS 
program less appealing as a result. These effects demonstrate the significance of the 
insurgency’s strength on the behavior of disengagement and its spread among members. 
 
Figure 8.   Correlation of Contagion Effects and the Insurgency in  
Afghanistan (2005–2009) 
Despite its questionable levels of effectiveness and poor implementation, analysis 
of the PTS program by provincial office, in Figure 9 below, indicates the effects of social 
contagion at a more micro level. Participation numbers were rarely stable from one year 
to the next in provincial offices where the PTS program was administered for at least two 
consecutive years, the number of insurgents who elected to disengage increased or 
decreased by a factor of 40%, or less, in fewer than one of every six periods.  
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Figure 9.   Annual Growth Rates of PTS Participation by Province205 
 
Figure 10.   Annual PTS Participation by Province 
It is not surprising that the Taliban has attempted to counter the contagion effects 
of the government’s reintegration and reconciliation efforts. They have attempted to deter 
fighters from disengaging through a campaign of threats and intimidation. In the cases of 
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those who have disengaged through PTS and other programs, they have exacted violent 
retribution against the former insurgents, as well as their family members.206  
4.  Observations 
The PTS program has not received sustained commitment from the GIRoA or its 
Western supporters.207 It has suffered from a lack of political will, as well as poor and 
corrupt management, as well as inadequate resources. It has also been unable to monitor 
recidivism; numerous low to mid-level commanders are known to have rejoined with the 
insurgency.208 These failures are likely to be significantly intertwined; when an insurgent 
does not receive what had been promised for their agreed upon disengagement from 
violence, it is logical for them to return to the means by which they previously provided 
for their family—the insurgency.  
Further diminishing the credibility of the government's offer, after 2001, senior 
Talibs were, at times, detained when they approached the GIRoA concerning local or 
informal amnesty offers. In many cases, they were sent to prison and sometimes tortured 
while in custody of Afghan security forces and interrogators. Consequently, many fear 
the legitimacy of government offers, as well as the possibility they might be incarcerated 
and abused. An example of this occurred in the southern region when those who 
reintegrated through PTS were promised a small piece of land, but the government never 
delivered. The GIRoA also failed to deliver on guarantees of protection and assistance 
with jobs.209  
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Recognizing the criticisms of PTS, the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration 
Program was recently initiated to disarm insurgents. Signed by President Hamid Karzai 
in June 2010, it is the most comprehensive effort to reconcile and reintegrate insurgents 
since 2001.210  
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VI.  FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
Each of the case studies demonstrated correlation between disengagement 
phenomena and the insurgency campaign’s lifecycle. Specifically, during periods where 
the number of attacks conducted by the insurgencies was increasing, there was a positive 
relationship between the number of insurgents who selected disengagement and attacks. 
That being said, at a certain point in the Malaya and Afghanistan case studies, a negative 
correlation prevailed. In Afghanistan, attacks continued to rise and a point was reached 
when the number of insurgents who disengaged started to decrease. Conversely, in 
Malaya, attacks reached a culminating point when they started to decline and the number 
of insurgents electing to disengage continued to increase. This suggests that when a point 
is reached that it becomes clear that one side—either the state or the insurgency—has a 
distinct advantage over the other, fighters will side with the strongest of the two sides in 
increasing numbers. In Afghanistan, it was the insurgency. In Malaya, it was the state.  
The overall trends of disengaged insurgents relative to the trends of insurgency 
campaign attacks seems to substantiate the presence of an intervening variable. Namely, 
the lifecycle stage of the insurgency campaign helps determine a disengagement 
program’s appeal. Even though disengagement at the individual level can help reduce an 
insurgency campaign’s capacity for violence, disengagement programs will be most 
effective when the insurgency campaign is in a state of gradual decline. I contend that 
disengagement still has merits during periods of growth, but its consequences during 
periods of decline are more likely to be a factor in bringing an insurgency to a more 
expeditious end.  
Contagion effects, measured in the case studies by the annual growth of 
disengagement totals, demonstrate a comparable correlation with the insurgency 
campaign’s growth trend. Most interesting, though, is the fact that the Malaya program 
was the only one in which social contagion continued to trend at an increasingly positive 
rate until nearly the end. Notably, this is the only program studied that took place in the 
  74
context of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. In the other two cases, negative 
growth rates persisted alongside generally unsuccessful efforts to counter the VC and 
Taliban insurgencies.   
An exception to the relationships described above was observed near the 
commencement of each of the three programs. A significant sharp increase in raw 
disengagement numbers and contagion occurred in at least one year as each program 
began. This seemingly occurred without regard to the diverse circumstances in each of 
the insurgencies. This suggests that a disengagement program can have immediate effects 
on an insurgency since it always has an appeal for less committed members by simply 
offering them an alternative to violence. To the extent that these individuals do not 
represent prototypical behavior or leave for reasons pertaining to the organization, their 
leaving will not have significant effects except to reduce the insurgency’s human capital 
and capacity to conduct violence and consequently not spread pervasively among other 
members in the organization. However, the contagion effects of these defections have the 
potential to more significantly impact the organization’s members when they are deemed 
to represent dissatisfaction with the organization, as demonstrated in Malaya where the 
contagion effects measured were shown to be the most significant for any one year period 
measured. Notably, in that instance, it is known that the prevailing reason for defection 
during this time was dislike of the insurgency campaign’s policy. 
Legitimacy was also a significant aspect of the appeal of the programs to 
insurgents. Although evidence was only anecdotal, it demonstrated that insurgents had to 
trust the promise of the government to not persecute them, as well as deliver them its 
promises. In the Vietnam and Afghanistan cases, the programs failed to reach some 
insurgents who viewed the respective governments to not be entirely credible. 
Conversely, the Malayan case demonstrated how elevated state capacity in the form of 
increased security force levels contributed to the government’s credibility as it elevated 
the threat of death or imprisonment. Finally, the viability of the government and its 
ability to successfully govern in the long term was critical. In this sense, these findings 
align with the expectation that individuals will be less prone to disengage when it means 
joining the losing side.  
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Due to the lack of available data on the rank of individuals who disengaged in 
each of the case studies, the effects and importance of leader disengagement could not be 
verified. Leader disengagement is perhaps the most unpredictable of variables because 
insurgency campaigns and their relationship with their leaders—as well as the importance 
of specific leaders—is unique to each campaign and is one that can be in a constant state 
of change. That being said, disengagement by a leader is still preferred over any other 
member based on their centrality alone, but may not necessarily have drastic impacts 
unless the leader is able to guide collective disengagement by their organization.  
B. WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED 
Typically, when discussing attacks on insurgent networks, military theorists and 
strategists refer to efforts devised to capture and kill insurgents based on their importance 
in the insurgency campaign’s instrumental network. This approach affects the network 
most directly by removing members and thus forcing it to adapt. It hedges its bets that the 
network will be unable to do so, or at least be ineffective while doing so. Although these 
types of activities are essential and must continue, the fact that it involves an involuntary 
physical separation from the organization only affects other members on a psychosocial 
basis by making real to them the potential for their own demise. As a result, they are not 
likely to produce far-reaching impacts for individual members and the overall social 
fabric of the organization.  
Conversely, individual disengagement has the potential to devastate an 
organization and its members as its consequences spread among instrumental and 
expressive networks. Viewing these impacts through the network perspective holds great 
promise. This paper has shown how voluntarily leaving an insurgency organization 
represents much more than involuntary removal by capturing or killing. The effects of 
this voluntary act go beyond human capital and instrumental networks and more 
efficiently undermine social capital and expressive networks. These processes have been 
shown to alter the insurgency’s social fabric and undermine trust. Moreover, the 
regeneration of expressive networks—and the social capital and trust that comes with 
them—is a much slower process than replacing human capital and expressive networks. 
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Not only does this mean that the social lubricant for operational security diminishes, the 
fear of compromise also spreads across the organization as insurgents contemplate the 
possible ramifications of former members complying with the state.  
This paper has also suggested that when friends choose to exit their organization 
and expressive networks, leaving behavior spreads via social contagion. Not only does 
this change what life in the organization is like for the members that remain, but it helps 
provide information about what things are like on the outside for someone who leaves, in 
terms of both threats and opportunities. Contagion effects also hurt the insurgency 
campaign’s efforts to recruit new members in the opposite manner by letting those 
potential recruits on the outside know what it is like on the inside.    
C. IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this paper suggest several factors to take into account when 
considering the strategy of a disengagement program. These include: 
1) Consider the program’s goals. Although disengagement can help to defeat an 
insurgency campaign, it comes with real economic and social costs to the more 
benevolent members of society. Rather than offering inducements to all members of the 
insurgency, the strategy should be as distinct and efficient as possible in achieving its 
stated goals. Programs designed to catalyze the demise of an already faltering insurgency 
will differ from those meant to reduce the number of fighters, fracture leaders, or 
undermine a campaign’s ideology. 
2) Timing will be an important factor when considering disengagement program 
objectives, as well as the membership level(s) it targets and the incentives it offers. Most 
significantly, the lifecycle stage of the insurgency campaign should be considered, as 
well as the state’s capacity to govern and provide security at the time.  
3) Recognize the importance of monitoring. Recidivism must be avoided as often 
as possible, and those that have disengaged must be protected. To achieve this, 
relocation, protection by security forces, and integration with security force efforts to 
defeat the insurgency should be considered.  
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4) Consider disengagement program features that have the potential to exploit 
social contagion within expressive networks. An example of this is offering additional 
inducements for disengaged insurgents who convince fighters with whom they are 
socially connected to duplicate their departure from violence.  
5) Recognize the importance of presenting valid threats that complement 
disengagement inducements and enhance their appeal as a feasible alternative. Increased 
size and capacity of security forces and the threat of capture and infiltration are examples 
of ‘sticks’ that can make the ‘carrot’ of disengagement a relatively more viable option. 
D. POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
To validate the conclusions drawn by this paper with a greater level of rigor, more 
detailed data is required than what is currently available. The most significant gap exists 
in data that provides insight into the psychosocial processes of individual insurgents that 
have disengaged from violence. To more adequately appreciate these processes and the 
effects of individual disengagement on the organization as a whole, surveys and 
interviews should be conducted with those persons who participated in disengagement 
programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Their social networks should also be analyzed. These data could also be used to 
verify the conclusion that disengagement phenomena align with expressive and 
instrumental network relationships. Additionally, examination of these data by time and 
location should help more precisely determine the effects of social contagion. Similar to 
the data presented in the Malayan study, individual reasons for surrender should be 
examined since what motivates an insurgent to disengage is too often considered as a 
rational choice rather than a function of psychosocial processes and personal network 
relationships.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Although disengagement cannot be the cornerstone of a counterinsurgency 
strategy, it holds great promise to help reduce an organization’s capacity to conduct 
violence and help bring about an insurgency’s demise more quickly. Resources are not 
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endless and disengagement provides a cost effective way to accomplish these objectives 
with less of a burden on security forces. The more appropriate and precise a 
disengagement program is, the less its economic costs.  
Social costs must also be considered in a program’s design. The reaction by 
society is likely to be negative to some extent, particularly on the basis of the rank of the 
disengaged, the inducements offered relative to the economic status of those citizens who 
were never active in the insurgency, and when the insurgency is in a state of decline and 
faces inevitable defeat—the very time this paper asserts disengagement will be most 
effective. Acceptance by society is arguably the most problematic aspect of any 
disengagement program. Because of this, sentiment toward these efforts must be 
appreciated prior to implementation and monitored throughout. 
That said, understanding the effects of appropriately targeted disengagement 
programs on insurgency campaigns and their members helps to best inform U.S. policy 
where these efforts are concerned. After all, successful disengagement programs reduce 
the social, political, and human costs of efforts to defeat insurgency campaigns. They 
complement the repressive measures that bear extreme economic and human costs. 
Where individuals are able to disengage from insurgency campaigns without personal 
danger or risk of returning to their old ways, they will be able rejoin their families, 
convince their friends to likewise depart from violence, and make vital contributions to 
civil society.  
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